0Treasury Proposes to Exempt Foreign Exchange Swaps and Forwards from Mandatory Central Clearing and Exchange Trading Requirements under Dodd Frank
As authorized under Section 1a(47)(E) of the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”), as amended by Section 721 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) has proposed to make a written determination that “foreign exchange swaps” and “foreign exchange forwards” (a) should not be regulated as swaps under the CEA and (b) are not structured to evade the Dodd-Frank Act in violation of any rule promulgated by the CFTC pursuant to Section 721(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act, and exempt foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards from the CEA’s definition of “swap.”
Under the CEA, foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards are narrowly defined.
-
A foreign exchange swap is a transaction that involves an exchange of two currencies on a set date at an agreed-upon price followed by a reverse exchange of those two currencies at a later date at an agreed‑upon price.
-
A foreign exchange forward is a future exchange of two currencies on a set date at an agreed-upon price.
Notably, other foreign exchange and currency derivatives, including foreign exchange options, currency swaps and non-deliverable forwards, would continue to be regulated as swaps under the CEA.
The most significant consequence of exempting foreign exchange swaps and forwards from the definition of swap under the CEA is to exclude them from the mandatory central clearing and exchange trading requirements under the CEA introduced by the Dodd‑Frank Act. However, even if they are exempted from the definition of swap under the CEA, foreign exchange swaps and forwards would remain subject to regulation by the CFTC, including the CFTC’s new trade-reporting requirements, enhanced anti-evasion authority, and strengthened business-conduct standards.
Treasury considered the following factors in making its proposed determination:
-
whether regulating FX swaps and forwards would create systemic risks to the market, lower transparency or threats to the financial stability of the U.S.;
-
whether FX swaps and forwards are already subject to a regulatory scheme comparable to CEA for other types of swaps;
-
the extent to which bank regulators provide adequate supervision, including through capital and margin requirements;
-
the extent of adequate payment and settlement systems; and
-
potential use of the exemption to evade other regulations.
In addressing these factors, Treasury noted that foreign exchange swaps and forwards have characteristics that distinguish their risk profile from the risk profiles of other swaps: only fixed payment obligations, physical settlement and generally short terms. Treasury observed that because of these characteristics, foreign exchange swap and forward participants generally face settlement risk rather than, as is the case with other derivatives, counterparty risk. Treasury viewed this settlement risk as being effectively addressed through standard terms such as payment-versus-payment settlement arrangements (in which each party’s delivery is conditioned on the other party’s delivery), including through CLS Bank International, and other market characteristics.
In support of the exemption, Treasury also cited the manner in which participants in foreign exchange swap and forward transactions are regulated and the nature of foreign exchange swap and forward markets themselves, observing that centralized trading could potentially increase costs and mandatory exchange trading would yield only marginal improvements in transparency.
-
Banks (on their own behalf and on behalf of their clients) account for approximately 95% of foreign exchange swap and forward transactions. Banks’ foreign exchange activities are already subject to coordinated supervision (e.g., through the Bank of International Settlements), including to ensure that they have adequate funding and capital, stability, internal control measures, and risk-management protocols, according to Treasury.
-
Central clearing would likely have a number of potentially negative consequences, according to Treasury, including potentially increasing risk and presenting operational challenges and costs: combining clearing and settlement in a central clearing party (CCP) would create such large currency and capital needs for the CCP, potentially no CCP would be able to provide central clearing for the market; central clearing, with its margin and capital requirements, would significantly increase the cost of foreign exchange swaps and forwards for end-users (and, of particular note, non-financial end users); and requiring clearing would disrupt the existing, and otherwise well‑functioning, foreign exchange swap and forward markets.
-
Foreign exchange swaps and futures markets are also generally transparent (e.g., multiple sources of pricing within markets) and liquid with, as reported by Treasury, approximately 41% and 72% of foreign exchange swaps and forwards already being traded on electronic exchanges.
The public has 30 days to comment on Treasury’s proposed determination after publication of the proposal in the Federal Register.
0FinCEN Issues Proposed Rule Implementing Section 104(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
FinCEN issued a proposed rule (the “ Proposed Rule“) that would implement section 104(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”) by requiring a U.S. bank (including a bank, savings bank, federal savings association, credit union, and certain other banking entities, each a “U.S. Bank”), within 30 days of receiving a specific written request from FinCEN, to report to FinCEN the following information about foreign banks (“Foreign Banks” and each a “Foreign Bank”) for which the U.S. Bank maintains a correspondent account: (1) whether the Foreign Bank maintains a correspondent account for an Iranian‑linked financial institution designated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (the “IEEPA”); (2) whether the Foreign Bank has processed one or more transfers of funds within the preceding 90 calendar days related to an Iranian-linked financial institution designated under the IEEPA, other than through a correspondent account; or (3) whether the Foreign Bank has processed one or more transfers of funds within the preceding 90 calendar days related to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) or any of its agents or affiliates designated under the IEEPA. If a U.S. Bank receives notification from a Foreign Bank that it has established a new correspondent account for an Iranian linked financial institution designated under the IEEPA, the U.S. Bank is required to report the information within 10 days of receiving that notification. The Proposed Rule would also require that the Foreign Bank agree to notify the U.S. Bank if it subsequently established a new correspondent account for an Iranian‑linked financial institution designated under the IEEPA at any time within 365 calendar days from the date of the Foreign Bank’s initial response. Additionally, when requested by FinCEN, the Proposed Rule would require a U.S. Bank to report instances in which the U.S. Bank does not maintain a correspondent account for a Foreign Bank specified by FinCEN in a written request.
Based on the reports, Treasury Officials would be able to take immediate action under Section 104(c) of CISADA, action that includes (but is not limited to) mandating the closure of the correspondent account or imposing sanctions against the U.S. Bank. Treasury Officials could also, among other things, consult with a Foreign Bank that answered a request in the affirmative or that was unwilling to respond to a request.
Comments on the Proposed Rule are due by June 1, 2011.
0OCC Issues Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions
0SEC Proposes Removal of References to Credit Ratings in Rules and Forms under the 1934 Act
The SEC issued Release No. 34-64352, proposing amendments to rules and forms under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) that would remove references to credit ratings by rating agencies (including nationally recognized statistical rating agencies or NRSROs). This rulemaking is mandated by Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires the SEC to “remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings, and to substitute in such regulations such standard of credit-worthiness” as the SEC determines to be appropriate. The SEC is also seeking comment, in advance of proposed rulemaking, with respect to the appropriate tests to be used in the definitions of “mortgage‑related security” (Section 3(a)(41) of the 1934 Act) and “small business related security” (Section 3(a)(53) of the 1934 Act) in lieu of credit ratings by an NRSRO.
Internal Credit and Liquidity Risk Assessment
In several of the proposed rule changes where references to NRSRO ratings would be deleted as a measure of creditworthiness, broker-dealers would be permitted to use internally generated credit and liquidity risk assessments, provided that they establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures designed to assess such risks. Among the factors the broker-dealer could consider in making risk assessments would be credit spreads, securities-related research, internal or external credit risk assessments (including those of credit rating agencies, whether or not they are NRSROs), default statistics and inclusion on a recognized index of instruments that are subject to a minimal amount of credit risk. The rules and forms under the 1934 Act that fall in this category are:
-
Rule 15c3-1, the Net Capital Rule, which specifies percentage discounts (or “haircuts”) in the market value of securities. Where lower haircut percentages are currently applied to securities rated investment grade, under the new standard they would be applied to securities determined by the broker-dealer, using its internal credit risk assessment procedures, to have a “minimal amount of credit risk.”
-
Appendix E to Rule 15c3-1. Broker-dealers using alternative net capital (“ANC”) computations under Appendix E are required to deduct, from net capital, credit risk charges that take counterparty risk into consideration. Currently, this can be based either on NRSRO credit ratings or the broker-dealer’s internal counterparty credit rating. The proposal would delete the NRSRO alternative, requiring broker-dealers to use internal credit ratings, the methodology of which must be approved by the SEC.
-
Appendix F to Rule 15c3-1. OTC derivatives dealers with strong internal risk management practices are allowed to utilize the mathematical modeling methods they use in their own business in order to compute deductions from net capital for market and credit risks from OTC derivatives transactions. There are two elements to that computation: counterparty risk and the concentration charge (where net replacement value in the account of any one counterparty exceeds 25% of the OTC derivatives dealer’s tentative net capital). The provisions of Appendix F currently permit the dealer to use either NRSRO credit ratings or internal credit ratings to calculate both elements. The proposed rule would delete the NRSRO alternative, requiring dealers to use internal credit ratings, the methodology of which must be approved by the SEC.
The SEC has also requested comment on whether internal credit ratings should be used, in rulemaking to supplement the definitions of “mortgage related securities” and “small business related securities” in Sections 3(a)(41) and 3(a)(53) of the 1934 Act, to replace the NRSRO credit rating standard deleted by the Dodd-Frank Act.
Major Market Foreign Currency
Appendix A to Rule 15c3-1 provides favorable treatment, for purposes of the Net Capital Rule, to currency options involving “major market foreign currency,” which is currently defined with reference to NRSRO credit ratings. The proposed amendment would change the definition to refer to foreign currencies for which there is a substantial inter-bank forward currency market.
Customer Protection Rule
Rule 15c3-3, Note G, permits a broker-dealer to include required customer margin for transactions in securities products as a debit in the reserve formula computation if that margin is required and on deposit at a clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization that meets any one of four criteria, including maintaining the highest investment-grade rating from an NRSRO. That criterion would be deleted, leaving the remaining three, which do not reference NRSRO ratings.
Regulation M
Rules 101 and 102 of Regulation M currently except transactions in “investment grade nonconvertible and asset-backed securities” from their prohibitions. That standard would be replaced with an exception for non-convertible debt securities, non-convertible preferred securities and asset-backed securities if they:
-
are liquid relative to the market for that asset class;
-
trade in relation to general market interest rates and yield spreads; and
-
are relatively fungible with securities of similar characteristics and interest rate yield spreads.
A person seeking to rely on this exception would be required to obtain third party verification of its determination. The SEC seeks comment on whether it should impose qualification standards on persons providing third party verification, what those qualification standards should be, and whether there should be limitations on how often a particular third party verifier can be used by a person seeking to use the exception.
Rule 10b-10 Confirmations
Rule 10b-10(a)(8) currently requires a broker-dealer to inform the customer in the confirmation if a debt security, other than a government security, is unrated by an NRSRO. Although the SEC believes that deletion of this requirement is not technically required by Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, because the reference is not designed to establish a standard of creditworthiness, the SEC proposes to delete the requirement as a change consistent with the intent of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The SEC also proposes non-substantive conforming changes to other rules and forms. Comments on the proposal are due 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register.
0Goodwin Procter Issues Client Alert on U.S. Supreme Court Decision Upholding Provision in Consumer Contract Barring Class-Wide Arbitration
0SEC Extends Comment Period on Rule Proposal that Would Require Exchanges to Establish Listing Standards Relating to Compensation Committees and Compensation Consultants
0SEC and CFTC Jointly Propose Rules and Interpretive Guidance Regarding Swap, Security-Based Swap and Mixed Swap Matters Pursuant to Dodd-Frank
0CFTC Staff Issues Concept Document in Advance of CFTC-SEC Public Roundtable on Dodd-Frank Implementation
0CFTC Proposes Rules Requiring Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting
0CFTC Proposes Capital Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants Not Subject to a Prudential Regulator
0CFTC Proposes Rules Establishing Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants
0CFTC Proposes Rules Designed to Protect Cleared Swaps Customer Contracts and Collateral
0CFTC Proposes Amendments to CFTC Regulations to Conform to Requirements in Dodd-Frank Act
Contacts
- /en/people/f/fischer-eric
Eric R. Fischer
Retired Partner