Alert
November 17, 2026

Shareholder Activism in the Energy Sector: Trends, Vulnerabilities, and Preparedness

Shareholder activism in the energy sector has entered a new phase. For most of the past decade, campaigns at energy companies focused on capital discipline, shareholder returns, and, for a period, climate strategy. Activists are now seeking to shape consolidation outcomes, portfolio composition, and leadership at significant companies in the industry against a backdrop of strong M&A activity, commodity price volatility, and shifting rules for shareholder engagement. Since the beginning of 2025, prominent activist shareholders have run public campaigns at supermajors, refiners, and independents alike, and several of the sector’s largest transactions have been preceded, accompanied, or followed by an activist campaign.

For boards and management teams of publicly traded energy companies, understanding the evolving activism landscape, identifying vulnerability indicators, and implementing proactive preparedness measures have become important components of company oversight. This article, a companion to our recent alert on shareholder activism in the utility sector, discusses structural and market dynamics that shape campaigns at oil and gas producers, refiners, and integrated companies, examines the interaction between activism and the industry’s consolidation cycle, and offers practical guidance for energy companies preparing for activism.

 

 

Shareholder Activism Remains Near Record Levels Across Sectors

Shareholder activism set records in 2025 and has remained elevated in 2026. Barclays counted 255 campaigns globally in 2025 at companies with market capitalizations above $500 million, surpassing the prior record of 249 set in 2018, with the United States accounting for 55% of activity (141 campaigns, up 23% year over year).1 Lazard recorded 184 new campaigns globally in the first half of 2026 — the busiest six-month period on record — up 20% year over year.2 Barclays’ narrower dataset shows 179 campaigns through September 30, 2026, down 7% from an unusually busy 2025 but in line with the four-year average.

Several key features of the current environment bear directly on all companies with activism risk, including energy companies:

  • Activity is concentrated among a group of prolific activists. The number of activists launching campaigns fell 14% year over year to 99 through the third quarter, and Elliott Investment Management alone launched 16 campaigns across seven countries.
  • M&A is the dominant demand. M&A-related demands accounted for 58% of all demands in the third quarter, and a record 22% of demands year to date called for the target to sell itself — the demand now facing Devon Energy.
  • Leadership change remains a prominent objective. 23 CEOs resigned within a year of an activist campaign through the third quarter, and BP p.l.c. has lost two chief executives and a chair to abrupt or forced departures since 2023.
  • Settlement remains the dominant path to the boardroom. Activists won 87 board seats globally through the third quarter, 67 of them through 32 settlements at US companies, and Diligent Market Intelligence reports that 84 of 85 US board seats won during the 2026 proxy season came through settlement rather than a contested vote.3

Activism in the Energy Sector

Energy companies have long been activist targets, but the character of the campaigns has evolved with the industry’s capital cycle. A previous wave challenged cost structures, capital allocation, and governance at companies that activists argued had prioritized production growth over returns. Examples include Elliott at Hess Corporation in 2013 (resulting in three board seats and an independent chairman), Elliott at Marathon Petroleum in 2019 (resulting in the separation of Speedway and the retirement of its chief executive), and Carl Icahn at Occidental Petroleum in 2020 (resulting in three board seats after the Anadarko Petroleum acquisition). Climate-themed activism in the sector culminated in Engine No. 1’s 2021 campaign at Exxon Mobil Corporation.

The current wave picked up momentum as capital discipline took hold and consolidation accelerated across the sector. Where the previous wave sought to impose capital discipline, the current wave contests what companies should do with the resulting cash flows and portfolios: Recurring themes are portfolio simplification, the return of cash to shareholders, leadership accountability, and whether the company should remain independent. Board changes have followed, but generally as the means of pursuing those demands rather than as the demands themselves. Since 2022, Elliott has run campaigns at Suncor Energy, Phillips 66, and BP. Elliott’s 2022 campaign at Suncor was followed within three months by the resignation of the chief executive officer, the appointment of three new independent directors, and the initiation of a strategic review for its retail business. At Phillips 66, Elliott won two of four board seats it sought at the 2025 annual meeting, and in March 2026, the company appointed two additional directors following further engagement with Elliott. At BP, where Elliott disclosed a stake of more than 5% in 2025, the company has since replaced its chief executive, changed its board chair, and reorganized around its oil and gas businesses. Kimmeridge Energy Management, an energy-focused investment firm, has run activist campaigns at SilverBow Resources, which agreed to be acquired by Crescent Energy days before a contested 2024 election; Coterra Energy, where its reported plan to nominate board candidates preceded the merger agreement with Devon Energy; and Devon itself. TOMS Capital Investment Management became a top-five holder of Devon in mid-2026 and in September called for a sale of the company. In November, after Devon announced that it had concluded a review of its portfolio with no additional asset sales planned, TOMS and Kimmeridge renewed their calls for a sale of the company.

Several patterns emerge from recent activist campaigns in the energy space:

  • Demands have clustered around a small number of theses. Whether the target is a supermajor, a refiner, or an independent producer, activists have pressed for, variously, a sale of the company or of noncore assets, the separation of businesses that activists contend would be valued more highly on a standalone basis, larger cash returns to shareholders, and changes to leadership and compensation. 
  • Energy specialist activists operate alongside generalist funds. Kimmeridge has positioned itself as an industry participant with operating experience and has put forward director nominees with energy industry backgrounds. Elliott and TOMS are examples of activists that operate in many sectors but with substantial capital and, as Elliott demonstrated at Phillips 66 in 2025, a willingness to take a contest to a vote. At Devon, an energy specialist and a generalist are now pressing demands in parallel.
  • Campaigns are resolved through transactions as well as settlements. A sale of the company is a relatively common outcome in the sector, especially for energy independents. Energen Corporation, SilverBow, and Coterra each agreed to be acquired within months of an activist’s public emergence.
  • Activists frequently return after a settlement. Elliott’s 2025 proxy contest at Phillips 66 followed a February 2024 agreement under which the company added a director with Elliott’s support, and Elliott meaningfully increased its Suncor position in the two years after its 2022 settlement with the company.

Drivers of Activism in the Energy Sector

The energy sector today presents characteristics that make it attractive to activists.

Consolidation and Conglomerate Discount

The sector continues to be in a period of consolidation. ExxonMobil’s acquisition of Pioneer Natural Resources in 2024 and Chevron Corporation’s acquisition of Hess in 2025 were followed in February 2026 by Devon’s all-stock combination with Coterra, which created a company with a combined enterprise value of approximately $58 billion. Consolidation creates activist targets at both ends of a deal. Before it, a company trading at a discount to peers is pressed to sell. After it, the combined company holds assets in several basins, carries integration risk, and trades at what activists may call a “conglomerate discount” until the portfolio is rationalized. Kimmeridge framed its Coterra campaign around an alleged mismatch between the gas assets of Cabot Oil & Gas and the oil assets of Cimarex Energy, the two companies whose 2021 merger formed Coterra, and its Devon campaign around the pace of noncore asset sales.

Capital Returns in a Volatile Price Environment

Return frameworks built around free cash flow, base-plus-variable dividends, and buybacks are benchmarks against which activists measure boards, and the first half of 2026 tested these benchmarks. Brent crude, in the low $70s before the conflict with Iran began in February 2026, rose above $100 per barrel within two weeks as traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was effectively halted, peaked above $126, and fell back to the low $80s in June when an interim US-Iran agreement reopened the strait. Analysts now expect a return to the mid-$70s by mid-2027. Windfall cash flow invites scrutiny of how cash is deployed, and a subsequent decline in cash flows may expose decisions made at the peak. Devon’s $8 billion repurchase program, announced on the day it closed the Coterra merger and a week after Kimmeridge called for higher returns, illustrates the pace at which capital allocation can become the terrain on which a campaign is waged.

Private Market Values and the Sum-of-the-Parts Thesis

Activists also look for pieces that are worth more apart than they are together. At Phillips 66 in 2025, Elliott argued that the midstream business and the company’s 50% interest in Chevron Phillips Chemical would each be valued more highly outside the company’s integrated structure. In the upstream market, the thesis frequently turns on commodity mix: With liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports and data center power demand supporting the outlook for natural gas, acquirers assign different multiples to gas-weighted and oil-weighted assets, and a mixed portfolio invites a demand to separate them. A rising volume of transactions by alternative investors in midstream and LNG assets in 2026 supplies the valuation marks that make the case concrete.

Leadership, Compensation, and the Retreat of Climate Activism

Governance is rarely the sole driver of an activist campaign, but it supplies a strong baseline or ancillary narrative. Kimmeridge’s November 2025 open letter to Coterra’s board called for an independent, nonexecutive chair and alleged shortcomings in board oversight, and its April 2026 letter to the “future board” of Devon called for a reset of executive compensation toward entirely performance-based incentives. Leadership change followed campaigns at Suncor, Marathon Petroleum, and BP. BP’s board changed its chair less than eight months into his tenure after 18% of shareholders had opposed his reelection. Reuters later reported that he had previously met with Elliott privately. 

Climate-themed pressure, by contrast, has receded. Follow This, the Netherlands-based shareholder group that has sponsored climate resolutions at the oil majors for the past decade, has refocused its resolutions on the financial risks of declining demand rather than on emission targets, and independent chair proposals drew only 15% support at Chevron and 28% at ConocoPhillips in 2026. Regulatory developments are likely to reinforce the trend. The proposal by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to rescind Rule 14a-8 would eliminate the federal mechanism that has carried shareholder proposals, including climate proposals, into company proxy statements, and the SEC’s Section 21(a) report on the 2021 ExxonMobil election, discussed below, bears directly on the coordinated voting campaigns that supported them.

The SEC’s Intervention in Climate-Themed Activism

On October 7, 2026, the SEC issued a report of investigation under Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) addressing whether members of Climate Action 100+, an investor-led climate engagement initiative, violated the Exchange Act’s beneficial ownership reporting provisions in connection with the election of Engine No. 1’s dissident nominees at ExxonMobil’s 2021 annual meeting. The SEC declined to bring an enforcement action but stated that it had “serious concerns” about the conduct of Climate Action 100+ members and other participants. The report took the position that coordinated engagement practices, such as “flagging” votes for members and applying public or client pressure to members whose votes do not align, may constitute circumstantial evidence of an agreement or understanding sufficient to form a “group” under Sections 13(d)(3) and 13(g)(3) of the Exchange Act, even where the coordination occurs through an intermediary and even where members have disclaimed group status.4

The report’s significance for climate-themed activism lies in how such campaigns have been won. Climate-themed campaigns have generally succeeded or approached success only when large institutional investors voted together in support of them, and the report addresses the coordination behind that voting. Engine No. 1, which held approximately 0.02% of the company’s shares, prevailed because large asset managers and public pension funds supported its nominees. The report describes how that support was organized and identifies compliance risks in the practices used to organize it, and institutional investors may become more cautious about pre-declaring votes, discussing voting intentions with intermediaries, and joining initiatives that target specific companies. Several large asset managers had already withdrawn from Climate Action 100+ before the report was issued. 

Taken together with the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, the report may contribute to a reduction in both the number of climate-related proposals at energy companies and the organized institutional support that has given climate-themed campaigns, whether shareholder proposals or dissident slates, their force. Energy companies should not necessarily conclude that institutional investors have lost interest in transition risk or capital discipline. The report confirms that investors remain free to exchange views with management and with one another. A more likely consequence is a change in form: Climate-related concerns may be more likely to be raised in bilateral engagement or folded into financially framed campaigns by a single fund than through coalition-backed proposals and voting campaigns.

Consolidation: Catalyst and Battleground

The consolidation cycle shapes activism in the energy sector.

An activist’s emergence frequently sparks a sale process. Because hostile acquisitions of public energy companies are rare, activists position themselves as the catalyst for a negotiated transaction, and the market often treats their arrival as a signal that a company may be in play. The Coterra sequence is instructive. Kimmeridge published its open letter to Coterra’s board in November 2025. In January 2026, while Coterra was in discussions with Devon and two other parties, reports surfaced that Kimmeridge intended to nominate the former chief executive of Pioneer Natural Resources and four other candidates for election to Coterra’s board. Coterra’s board promptly met to review proposals from Devon and the two other parties. Days later, Devon and Coterra signed their merger agreement.

The deal, however, does not necessarily end the campaign. Kimmeridge supported the Coterra/Devon merger on the day it was announced but demanded portfolio rationalization, published a letter to the “future board” a week before closing, reportedly voted against every director at the annual meeting, criticized the pace of asset sales in July, and by September, four months after closing, was calling for board replacement or a sale. Here, a combined company entered its integration period with an activist already on the shareholder list and a set of demands against which the company’s first several quarters will be judged.

Activists may also adapt their demands to the execution risk of the integration itself. Where a combined company’s plan depends on a sequence of divestitures, an activist may argue that shareholders should not bear the risk of that sequence. TOMS’s September 2026 letter argued that Devon should sell itself outright rather than pursue piecemeal divestitures, so that a strategic buyer, rather than Devon’s current shareholders, would bear the execution risk of asset sales. A post-merger company may therefore face, at the same time, one activist demanding faster asset sales and another demanding a sale of the whole company.

How Activists Profile Energy Companies

Activists searching for energy targets review a broad range of performance, financial, structural, and governance indicators.

On performance and valuation, activists compare total shareholder returns, enterprise value to EBITDA, and free cash flow yield against a target’s peer group, with particular attention to discounts that persist through a commodity cycle. TOMS’s letter observed that Devon traded at roughly 4.5 times estimated 2027 EBITDA. A stock that has lagged behind peers during a period of high prices is especially exposed because the price environment removes a ready-made explanation.

On the asset base and capital program, activists analyze inventory depth and quality, break-even prices, reinvestment rates, and the sensitivity of the return framework to price assumptions, while refiners and integrated companies are assessed on utilization, capture rates, and corporate costs relative to pure-play peers.

On portfolio composition, activists look for basin count, commodity mix, and noncore businesses — retail networks, chemicals interests, midstream systems, and international assets — that private or strategic buyers would value at a higher multiple than the public market assigns, paying close attention to recently acquired assets that management has said must compete for capital.

Governance considerations typically reinforce rather than originate a campaign, but activists will assess director tenure, board leadership structure, refreshment history, incentive plan design, and say-on-pay and director support trends prior to initiating a campaign against a target.

Preparedness for Activism at Energy Companies

The companies best positioned to preempt and manage activist situations are those that assess vulnerabilities in advance, build durable shareholder relationships, and establish response frameworks before pressure emerges.

  • An internally conducted vulnerability analysis, performed before an activist emerges, is critical. For energy companies, the analysis should address, as applicable, relative valuation through the cycle, inventory depth and breakevens, the return framework and its sensitivity to prices, the private market value of separable assets, the status of any integration or divestiture program, compensation design, governance profile, and peer benchmarking.
  • Companies should be prepared to explain portfolio decisions and divestiture timelines. An activist’s alternative plan in this sector is usually a simpler portfolio, a faster divestiture program, or a sale. A board that has articulated the rationale for retaining each asset, met its divestiture milestones, and quantified the standalone value of the integrated enterprise can answer that plan with a record rather than a promise.
  • Treat the integration period as one of heightened exposure. Activists now engage before closing, including through letters addressed to the “future board” of a combined company, and judge the combined company against synergy targets and portfolio commitments from the first quarter. Boards should anticipate pre-closing engagement and disclose progress against announced targets.
  • Stress-test the capital return framework and compensation design. Boards should understand how their return framework compares with peers across a range of prices and how windfall cash flow will be allocated, and compensation committees should be able to defend performance-based weighting, the choice between absolute and relative metrics, and the peer group, each a standard element of activist critiques.
  • Boards should periodically assess and refresh their governance profile. Directors with tenures far above the index average, a combined chair and CEO structure, and declining say-on-pay or director support are among the indicators that frequently attract a withhold campaign, and refreshment undertaken on the board’s own initiative is generally more persuasive than refreshment conceded under pressure. Boards should also adopt, and follow, a protocol governing directors’ meetings with shareholders, including activists, so that such meetings are authorized in advance, prepared for, and reported to the full board.
  • Modernize the bylaws on a clear day. Universal proxy and the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech have reset expectations for advance notice provisions: narrowly defined terms, disclosure aligned with Schedule 13D, an affirmative duty to update, and procedures addressing withdrawn or noncompliant solicitations. Companies with shareholder special meeting rights should confirm that request procedures, ownership definitions, and record-date mechanics are in place, and Texas corporations should consider the thresholds now available under Texas law. Amendments adopted in the ordinary course, well before the nomination window opens, are generally more defensible than amendments adopted with a dissident at the door.
  • Companies should prioritize proactive shareholder engagement. The institutional investors whose votes will decide a contest apply their own stewardship policies, and dissent that surfaces in a say-on-pay vote or a director’s support level typically reflects those policies rather than proxy advisor recommendations alone. Off-season engagement should address those policies directly, surface concerns before they appear in a vote, and document the board’s responsiveness.
  • Scenario planning and response protocols are essential. A response team, stock and website surveillance, a “break-the-glass” plan, and a decision tree for responding to a Schedule 13D, a public letter, or a nomination notice should be in place before the advance notice window opens; for energy companies, the plan should also address inbound acquisition interest, which frequently follows an activist’s emergence.
  • Treat settlements as a pause rather than a resolution. Standstills expire and designees depart, and the record in the sector shows that activists frequently return when they do, sometimes within a year of a cooperation agreement and sometimes with a larger position than before. Preparedness should not lapse while a cooperation agreement is in force.

Looking Ahead to 2027

To the extent consolidation continues, each combination creates a candidate for a simplification campaign in the period after closing. The progress of the campaigns now underway at recently combined companies may serve as a template for the next post-merger situation.

While activists may identify real areas of vulnerability, the existence of such risks does not mean an activist’s proposals are appropriate, achievable at the prices the activist assumes, or aligned with long-term shareholder interests. Boards and management teams nonetheless benefit from understanding the activist’s thesis and underlying assumptions. Careful review of the analysis supports sound decision-making, creates a record of constructive engagement, and places the company in a stronger position to respond.


  1. [1] 2025 Review of Shareholder Activism, Barclays (2026). ↩

  2. [2] Review of Shareholder Activism – H1 2026, Lazard (2026). ↩

  3. [3] Q3 2026 Review of Shareholder Activism, Barclays (2026); Proxy Season Review 2026, Diligent Market Intelligence (2026). ↩

  4. [4] Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Climate Action 100+ and the Election of Directors at the May 2021 Annual Meeting of ExxonMobil Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-106611, SEC (2026). See “SEC Issues Section 21(a) Report on Investor Coalitions, ‘Group’ Formation, and Schedule 13G Eligibility,” Goodwin (2026). ↩

This informational piece, which may be considered advertising under the ethical rules of certain jurisdictions, is provided on the understanding that it does not constitute the rendering of legal advice or other professional advice by Goodwin or its lawyers. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.