Antitrust & Competition Technology Update Q1 2025

Trump-Era Antitrust and Global Flexibility Create Opening for Renewed Tech M&A

The first quarter of 2025 brought a surge of high-profile merger activity in the technology and artificial intelligence (AI) space, offering an early test of how antitrust regulators under the new Trump administration will handle technology deals. Initial signals indicate that US enforcers remain willing to challenge deals they view as anticompetitive under traditional horizontal theories of harm — particularly mergers between direct competitors with leading market positions. This was most evident in the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) January 2025 lawsuit to block Hewlett Packard Enterprise’s $14 billion acquisition of Juniper Networks. At the same time, however, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) closed its investigation into IBM’s acquisition of HashiCorp — a vertical transaction involving dominant products in cloud infrastructure — suggesting a possible retreat from the more expansive theories of harm that characterized the prior administration. Other notable transactions, such as Google/Wiz, CoreWeave/Weights & Biases, and Getty Images/Shutterstock, reflect a shifting enforcement climate and changing expectations among dealmakers. Meanwhile, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is advancing a more flexible, pro-growth approach to merger enforcement, further signaling a global recalibration in how regulators balance competition concerns with innovation and investment.   

DOJ Challenges Hewlett Packard Enterprise’s Acquisition of Juniper Networks

After a nearly yearlong investigation, the DOJ filed suit on January 30, 2025, to block Hewlett Packard Enterprise’s (HPE) proposed $14 billion acquisition of Juniper Networks.¹ According to the complaint, HPE and Juniper are the second- and third-largest providers of enterprise-grade wireless local area network (WLAN) solutions in the US, behind Cisco. The deal would combine two of the three leading firms, leaving Cisco and the combined company controlling over 70% of the market. The DOJ’s complaint highlights internal documents showing head-to-head competition between HPE and Juniper for key customers and dismisses the merging parties’ efficiency defenses as insufficient to offset the merger’s anticompetitive effects.

This case marked the first major merger challenge under President Trump’s second administration, and it suggests that aggressive enforcement may continue — at least for horizontal mergers — despite expectations in some quarters of a more permissive regulatory approach. Notably, the transaction cleared unconditionally in 14 jurisdictions outside the United States. The European Commission concluded that the combined company would “continue to face competition from a wide range of competitors” and that “HPE and Juniper are not each other’s closest competitors.”² The UK’s CMA reached a similar conclusion, citing “important competitive constraints from a number of other suppliers,” including Cisco and three additional rivals.³ 

The DOJ, however, took a more critical view, relying on market shares of approximately 27% for HPE and 7% for Juniper. Although the DOJ emphasized that the combined company and Cisco would jointly control over 70% of the market, HPE’s and Juniper’s combined share is just over 30%, with roughly 30% still held by competitors outside the top three. While the DOJ’s case relies on a traditional horizontal theory of harm — loss of head-to-head competition — these post-transaction concentration levels don’t make this a clear winning case for the DOJ. The challenge underscores that high-profile tech mergers between direct competitors with leading positions, even those with moderate combined shares, remain firmly in the DOJ’s sights.

FTC Clears IBM-Red Hat’s Acquisition of HashiCorp

A decision by the FTC in the first quarter of 2025 may signal a shift in enforcement priorities under the new Trump administration away from primarily vertical deals toward greater scrutiny of transactions between direct competitors. Shortly after the change in leadership, the FTC closed its second request investigation into IBM’s $6.4 billion acquisition of HashiCorp.⁴ 

IBM previously acquired Red Hat, an open-source enterprise software company, for $34 billion in 2019. Red Hat offers Ansible, a leading multicloud infrastructure-as-code (IaC) configuration tool. HashiCorp’s primary product, Terraform, is a leading multicloud IaC provisioning tool. Prior to acquisition, both products held substantial market shares — Ansible with over 80% in configuration tools and Terraform with more than 60% in provisioning tools.⁵   

The FTC issued a second request in July 2024, and the UK’s CMA opened a Phase 1 review in December 2024. Regulators expressed concern that IBM could bundle Ansible and Terraform, effectively requiring customers to adopt both products and making it harder for rival configuration or provisioning tools to compete. Another concern was the potential for IBM to restrict interoperability with competing tools by limiting access to application programming interfaces (APIs) or compatibility features.

However, the CMA closed its investigation in February 2025, concluding that such interoperability restrictions would be technically challenging and likely to provoke customer backlash — both of which could drive customers to alternative solutions. The CMA also found that bundling would not significantly foreclose competition.⁶   

Although the FTC did not publicly disclose its rationale, the timing of the closure — just after the administration’s transition — was notable. The transaction featured several characteristics that might have drawn close scrutiny under the previous FTC chair, Lina Khan: vertically related products, dominant market positions, and tools critical to multicloud operations.

The contrasting outcomes in HPE/Juniper and IBM/HashiCorp highlight a key distinction in enforcement focus. The challenged HPE/Juniper transaction involved moderate post-merger market shares in a deal involving direct competitors, while the cleared IBM/HashiCorp deal involved vertically related players with high shares in their respective markets. These early moves suggest the new US administration may be retreating from vertical and other, more novel, theories of harm while continuing to scrutinize mergers between direct competitors.

Google Announces $32 Billion Acquisition of Wiz

After challenges to vertical transactions by Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon under the Biden administration, major acquisitions by the biggest technology companies significantly slowed over the last several years. Then just under a month into the Trump administration, Google announced its largest purchase ever: a $32 billion acquisition of the cloud security platform Wiz.⁷    Wiz had reportedly turned down Google’s $23 billion bid in July 2024 due in part to concerns over scrutiny from Biden antitrust regulators.⁸ That Wiz accepted Google’s bid eight months later reflects a belief that acquisitions by big tech are more likely to get done, though the additional $9 billion added to the purchase price and a $3.2 billion breakup fee also likely played a significant role in the decision.

This will be a key deal to watch through the regulatory process. Given Google’s position as a major cloud infrastructure provider and Wiz’s position as a large, cloud-agnostic security platform, regulators will certainly probe vertical foreclosure, bundling, and interoperability issues. Anticipating these issues, Google has committed to Wiz’s products remaining available and functional across all major cloud platforms. If the transaction navigates global antitrust reviews, more acquisitions by the largest tech firms that have been pent up over the last few years could follow in 2025 and 2026. 

Significant Tech M&A Activity to Watch

In addition to the high-profile Google/Wiz transaction, the first quarter of 2025 saw several major M&A developments that may offer important signals about how US and global antitrust regulators will approach deals, especially in the rapidly evolving AI ecosystem.

On March 4, 2025, CoreWeave, a specialized AI cloud computing provider, announced an agreement to acquire Weights & Biases, a leading machine learning operations platform, for a reported $1.7 billion.⁹ CoreWeave, which recently went public, aims to integrate Weights & Biases’ suite of tools — including experiment tracking, model training, and deployment workflows — into its high-performance cloud infrastructure tailored for AI workloads. Weights & Biases is widely used by AI researchers and enterprise teams, including AI giants like OpenAI and Meta.

This vertical integration brings together a major AI infrastructure provider with a widely adopted developer toolset, which could have raised concerns about vertical foreclosure and self-preferencing. Regulators may have scrutinized whether CoreWeave could restrict access to Weights & Biases for rival infrastructure providers or prioritize its own services in ways that limit competition. In public statements, CoreWeave emphasized its commitment to maintaining Weights & Biases’ interoperability across different cloud environments and deployment options. The fact that the deal closed by early May suggests that the regulatory review did not uncover evidence to substantiate possible concerns.

Another significant transaction was announced on March 10, 2025, when ServiceNow announced its largest acquisition to date: the $2.85 billion purchase of Moveworks, an AI company that automates workplace support tasks using agentic AI models.¹⁰ 

Given Moveworks’ history of integrating across diverse service management platforms, this acquisition may raise antitrust concerns about tying and foreclosure. Regulators could examine whether ServiceNow plans to limit Moveworks’ availability on competing platforms or reduce functionality outside its ecosystem, thereby nudging customers toward exclusive adoption of ServiceNow products. Another line of inquiry may focus on whether ServiceNow was independently developing similar AI capabilities and if the acquisition could reduce incentives for innovation in the space.

Finally, on January 7, 2025, Getty Images and Shutterstock announced a $3.7 billion merger of equals.¹¹ The companies positioned the deal as a strategic move to enhance investment in content creation, real-time event coverage, and AI-driven innovation — particularly in the generative AI space. 

As two of the largest players in the stock photography and visual media market, their proposed merger is likely to draw close antitrust scrutiny. Regulators may be concerned that the consolidation could lessen competition, resulting in higher prices or diminished service quality for customers or worse terms for contributors such as photographers, videographers, and illustrators. These concerns likely prompted the DOJ to issue a second request on April 2, signaling the start of a more in-depth merger investigation. Although both companies maintain that they expect the deal to close in the second half of the year, the second request signals that mergers between leading players in digital content markets will continue to face significant regulatory hurdles. 

CMA’s More Flexible Approach to Merger Remedies

The CMA has recently signaled a notable shift toward a more flexible, business-friendly approach to merger enforcement, aligning with the government’s broader pro-growth agenda. In February 2025, the UK government published a draft strategic steer aimed at aligning the CMA’s regulatory activities with what it termed the “overriding national priority” of economic growth.¹² This marked a significant turning point in the CMA’s approach to merger control and remedies.

Following this government guidance, on March 12, 2025, the CMA unveiled its “Mergers charter” for businesses and launched a “call for evidence” to review its approach to merger remedies.¹³ This initiative represents the CMA’s commitment to developing a more proportionate and flexible framework that reduces uncertainty for businesses engaging in M&A activities in the UK.

The CMA recently concluded a consultation¹⁴ exploring potential reforms to its merger remedies framework. It is considering whether to allow more complex remedies at Phase 1, challenging the current requirement that they be “clear cut” and immediately implementable. The CMA is also evaluating how remedies might better preserve pro-competitive efficiencies and customer benefits, signaling a more balanced approach to merger assessment. Finally, the consultation aims to streamline the remedies process to reduce uncertainty and regulatory burden for businesses. The CMA plans to use feedback to develop specific proposals for consultation in the autumn of 2025, with final guidance expected by the end of the year.

The CMA’s approach in the merger of Vodafone and Three illustrates its increasing flexibility with remedies. The transaction — which reduced the number of UK mobile network operators from four to three — was initially expected to face significant challenges. However, the CMA approved the merger subject to a package of structural and behavioral remedies.¹⁵ These included a commitment by the combined company to implement an eight-year program of network upgrades and improvements monitored by the CMA and the UK telecoms regulator (Ofcom). In addition, selected mobile tariffs and data plans will be subject to three-year price caps to protect consumers from short-term price increases. The companies also agreed to fixed prices and contract terms for wholesale services over the same three-year period, ensuring virtual network providers have access to competitive terms. 

The remedy package in Vodafone/Three is notable for its long-term focus and reliance on behavioral commitments, rather than the structural remedies the CMA traditionally favored in market consolidation cases. The CMA concluded that these remedies would produce efficiencies by improving the quality of the combined network and strengthening competition among the three remaining mobile network operators, while protecting consumers during the transition period.

The CMA’s more flexible approach to merger remedies could have significant implications for tech mergers, allowing for more tailored solutions suited to digital markets. Instead of blocking deals outright, the CMA may increasingly accept complex behavioral remedies such as data-sharing commitments, API access guarantees, and interoperability requirements that address competition concerns while preserving innovation. Tech companies could benefit from shorter review timelines with more Phase 1 clearances with commitments, though they may need to accept longer monitoring periods and more sophisticated compliance obligations, similar to the eight-year improvement plan in the Vodafone/Three case. This approach opens the door for tech mergers that might previously have been blocked, provided companies engage proactively and thoughtfully in remedy design from the outset.

Google Continues to Face Global Antitrust Litigation

Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic are moving to reshape Google’s dominant digital platforms. In the US, Google and the DOJ have submitted competing remedy proposals following a court ruling that Google unlawfully maintained monopolies in search. In Europe, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a significant ruling in Alphabet Inc., and Others v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (the Android Auto case), requiring dominant platforms to provide broader third-party access. Together, these developments reflect a growing focus on structural- and interoperability-based remedies to address alleged harms to competition.

Google Search Remedies Submitted 

On August 5, 2024, Judge Amit Mehta of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Google had unlawfully maintained monopolies in the general search services and search advertising markets. The court found that Google used exclusive agreements with device manufacturers (such as Apple) and browser developers to secure default search engine status, thereby suppressing competition.

Following this liability ruling, the DOJ and Google submitted competing proposals for remedies. On March 7, 2025, the DOJ filed a Revised Proposed Final Judgment. Key provisions included a ban on Google’s use of default search agreements and a requirement that Google divest its Chrome browser. While the proposal did not immediately require divestiture of Android, it included a contingent requirement: if the other remedies fail to restore competition within five years, Google could be forced to sell Android.

Other central elements of the DOJ’s proposal involved data access and syndication. Google would be required to share user-side data (such as clicks and queries) and portions of its search index with competitors. According to the DOJ, these measures are intended to break the “data feedback loop” that, the DOJ claims, reinforces Google’s dominance, allowing rivals to improve their own search technologies. The DOJ also proposed a mandatory syndication regime, requiring Google to provide access to its search results, ranking signals, and query interpretation data.

The DOJ’s original proposal included the divestiture of Google’s AI assets, but this was later narrowed to a requirement that Google notify authorities in advance of any future AI-related acquisitions. The DOJ argued that these structural and behavioral remedies are necessary to eliminate Google’s illegal monopoly, prevent Google from benefiting from its past misconduct, and deter future anticompetitive behavior.

Google submitted its own, more limited remedy proposal, focused on the specific conduct found unlawful by the court. Google offered to make its Android and browser contracts more flexible by allowing multiple default search providers and enabling partners to change defaults more frequently — such as once every 12 months. The company also proposed giving device manufacturers the ability to preload multiple search engines and install Google apps independently of Search or Chrome. Google contended that the DOJ’s proposed remedies were overly broad and harmful to consumers and innovation and went beyond the scope of the court’s liability findings.

ECJ Mandates Broader Access to Dominant Digital Platform Infrastructure

In February, the ECJ issued its preliminary ruling in the Android Auto case, which originated from Google’s refusal to ensure interoperability between its Android Auto platform and the JuicePass app (which helps electric vehicle drivers locate and reserve charging stations).¹⁶ After a complaint by JuicePass, the Italian Competition Authority imposed a €102 million fine on Google for abuse of dominance, which Google appealed to the Italian Council of State, leading to a referral to the ECJ.

The ECJ issued a ruling that significantly narrows the essential facilities doctrine by establishing that dominant digital platforms must provide third-party access when the platform was designed for third-party use rather than exclusively for the platform owner’s needs. In such cases, refusing interoperability may constitute an abuse of dominance even when platform access is not essential for the third party’s success. This effectively creates a “convenient   facilities doctrine” that requires dominant platforms to justify any access refusal with concrete evidence of technical impossibility or genuine security concerns, not merely commercial preferences. 

This ruling has profound implications for platform operators, extending obligations similar to those in the Digital Markets Act beyond designated “gatekeepers” to any platform with significant market power. While platforms must generally provide access and develop interoperability tools for third parties, they retain some protections: they can request fair financial contributions for integration costs and take reasonable time to implement complex technical changes.

UK Digital Regulation

UK DMCCA Enforcement: Strategic Market Status Investigations into Google and Apple
As previewed in our “Antitrust and Competition Technology Year in Review 2024,” the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA) came into force on January 1, 2025. While aligned with the EU’s DMA in seeking to regulate digital markets, the DMCCA gives the CMA greater flexibility by allowing it to impose tailored conduct requirements and pro-competitive interventions on firms designated with “Strategic Market Status” (SMS). In January 2025, the CMA launched its first investigations under the new regime, targeting Alphabet and Apple.

Google Search and Search Advertising Investigation
The first investigation concerns Google’s dominance in search and search advertising, in which it holds over 90% market share in the UK and serves over 200,000 advertisers. The CMA is examining whether Google’s conduct limits competition, stifles innovation (especially in AI), involves self-preferencing, or constitutes exploitative practices — such as excessive data collection or unfair use of publisher content. A final SMS decision is due by October 13, 2025, and potential remedies may include data-sharing obligations, restrictions on self-preferencing, and enhanced rights for publishers.

Apple and Google Mobile Ecosystems Investigation
The second investigation focuses on Apple’s and Google’s mobile ecosystems, covering operating systems, app stores, and browsers. The CMA is assessing whether these platforms impose unfair terms on app developers, restrict competition, leverage their market power to favor their own services, or limit user choice. Possible interventions could require greater data access, improved interoperability, increased transparency in ranking systems, or changes to App Store and Play Store admission processes.

^[1] Complaint, United States v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co., No. 3:25-cv-00951 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2025). URL: https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1387541/dl
^[2] “Commission approves acquisition of Juniper by HPE,” European Commission (July 31, 2024). (July 31, 2024). URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4101
^[3] “Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company / Juniper Networks, Inc. merger inquiry,” GOV.UK (June 19, 2024). URL: Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company / Juniper Networks, Inc. merger inquiry - GOV.UK
^[4] Paul Sawers, “IBM closes $6.4B HashiCorp acquisition,” TechCrunch (Feb. 27, 2025). URL: https://techcrunch.com/2025/02/27/ibm-closes-6-4b-hashicorp-acquisition/
^[5] “Anticipated acquisition by Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company of Juniper Networks, Inc.,” U.K. Competition & Mkts. Authority (May 28, 2025). URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6650ba2fbf1f8700127b4b9d/Final_decision_HPE_Juniper.pdf.  
^[6] Id.
^[7] “Google announces agreement to acquire Wiz,” Inside Google (Mar. 18, 2025). URL: https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/google-agreement-acquire-wiz/
^[8] Rohan Goswami, Jennifer Elias, Jordan Novet, “Wiz walks away from $23 billion deal with Google, will pursue IPO,” CNBC (July 23, 2024). URL: https://www.cnbc.com/2024/07/23/google-wiz-deal-dead.html
^[9] Michael Intrator, “CoreWeave and Weights & Biases to Join Forces,” CoreWeave (Mar. 4, 2025). URL: https://www.coreweave.com/blog/coreweave-and-weights-biases-to-join-forces
^[10] “ServiceNow to extend leading agentic AI to every employee for every corner of the business with acquisition of Moveworks” ServiceNow (Mar. 2025). URL: https://www.servicenow.com/company/media/press-room/servicenow-to-acquire-moveworks.html
^[11] “Getty Images and Shutterstock to Merge, Creating a Premier Visual Content Company,” Getty Images (Jan. 7, 2025). URL: https://newsroom.gettyimages.com/en/getty-images/getty-images-and-shutterstock-to-merge-creating-a-premier-visual-content-company
^[12] “Draft strategic steer to the Competition and Markets Authority,” GOV.UK (May 15, 2025). URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority/strategic-steer-to-the-competition-and-markets-authority
^[13] “Mergers charter,” GOV.UK (Mar. 12, 2025). URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mergers-charter-how-to-work-with-the-cma-on-a-merger-investigation/mergers-charter
^[14] “CMA launches review of merger remedies approach and publishes new mergers charter,”" (Mar. 12, 2025).  GOV.UK (Mar. 12, 2025). URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-review-of-merger-remedies-approach-and-publishes-new-mergers-charter
^[15] “CMA clears Vodafone / Three merger, subject to legally binding commitments,” GOV.UK" (Dec, 5, 2024).  (Dec. 5, 2024). URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-clears-vodafone-three-merger-subject-to-legally-binding-commitments
^[16] Alphabet Inc., and Others v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, C-233/23, EU:C:2025:110 (Feb. 25, 2025).

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