0Federal Circuit Takes a Hard Look at the “Entire Market Value Rule”

A patent owner may recover from an infringer “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”  35 U.S.C. § 284.  Reasonable royalty damages typically are determined by applying a royalty rate (the royalty percentage) to a royalty base (revenue derived from the infringing activity).  For example, a 5% royalty rate applied against $200 million in sales of an infringing product would result in a reasonable royalty damages calculation of $10 million.  The calculation is seldom that simple, however, because this example assumes that all of the revenue derived from sale of the infringing product should constitute the royalty base.  But what if the infringed patent concerns only one feature of many in the infringing product?  Should all of the revenue derived from the sale of the infringing product form the royalty base, or should the royalty rate be applied against only a portion of the infringing revenue, to account only for the contribution that the invention claimed in the infringed patent made to those sales?

Under certain circumstances it may be appropriate to apply a royalty against the entire revenue base of an infringing product even if the claimed invention constitutes only one feature of that product.  In particular, the entire market value rule “permits recovery of damages based on the value of the entire apparatus containing several features, where the patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand.”  State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In other words, where the patented feature drives customer demand for the entire product, the entire market value rule permits the patent owner to treat all revenue from the infringing product as an appropriate royalty base when calculating reasonable royalty damages.

As part of its patent reform efforts, Congress has been considering a variety of statutory revisions aimed at limiting the ability of patent owners to recover damages considered by some to be excessive, including restrictions on the scope and application of the entire market value rule.  Commentators have argued that the rule is misplaced or inconsistent with the Patent Act’s damages provisions.  For its part, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently confirmed the viability of the rule, but in so doing it made clear that courts must be vigilant when applying the rule to protect against excessive damages awards.

Lucent v. Gateway

In an opinion written by Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, the Federal Circuit vacated a $358 million damages award in favor of Lucent and remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial on damages.  Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  The Federal Circuit found two errors in the district court’s application of the entire market value rule.  First, the Federal Circuit found a lack of evidence to support the jury’s finding that Lucent’s patented invention formed the basis for consumer demand for the defendants’ infringing products.  Second, the court criticized the approach adopted by Lucent’s licensing expert.  Initially, Lucent sought to apply a 1% royalty rate to a royalty base comprised of sales of computers containing the infringing software; after the district court precluded Lucent from applying its royalty rate to this larger royalty base, Lucent sought to apply an increased royalty rate of 8% to a royalty base comprised of sales of software.  The Federal Circuit observed that by increasing the royalty rate, “Lucent’s expert tried to reach the damages number he would have obtained had he used the price of the computer as a royalty base.”   

Lucent accused the defendants of infringing a patent directed to a method of entering information into fields of a computer screen without using a keyboard (i.e., the patented date-picker feature).  Lucent accused Microsoft’s Outlook, Money and Windows Mobile of using the patented “date picker” feature.  Microsoft sold approximately 110 million units of the three accused products, with a total value of sales of approximately $8 billion.  At trial, Lucent sought an 8% royalty against sales revenue for the accused products, and asked the jury to award $561.9 million.  The jury ultimately awarded a lump-sum royalty payment of approximately $358 million.

In reviewing the jury’s damages award, the Federal Circuit noted:

[t]he evidence can support only a finding that the infringing feature contained in Microsoft Outlook is but a tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program…Outlook is an enormously complex software program comprising hundreds, if not thousands or even more, features.  We find it inconceivable to conclude, based on the present record, that the use of one small feature, the date-picker, constitutes a substantial portion of the value of Outlook…The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that the infringing use of Outlook’s date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and that the portion of the profits that can be credited to the infringing use of the date-picker too is exceedingly small.

In light of this evidence that the infringing use of the date-picker tool was only a minor aspect of a much larger software program, that the vast majority of other features did not infringe, and the relative importance of these other non-infringing features (e.g., email), the Federal Circuit concluded that “Lucent did not carry its evidentiary burden of proving that anyone purchased Outlook because of the patented method” and that Lucent, therefore, did not satisfy its burden to recover damages under the entire market value rule.

The Federal Circuit also took issue with the approach adopted by Lucent’s licensing expert.  Initially, Lucent attempted to apply the entire market value rule to the sale of the computers loaded with the accused software and applied a 1% royalty rate to the entire price of the computers loaded with Outlook.  The district court excluded testimony applying the entire market value rule to the royalty base of the revenues associated with the sale of the computers, however, so Lucent changed its position at trial.  In view of the district court’s ruling, Lucent accepted that the royalty base should be the price of the software – not the entire computer – but it argued that the royalty rate should be increased to 8%, rather than the 1% it applied when the royalty base was the higher priced computer.  The Federal Circuit observed that:

Lucent’s expert tried to reach the damages number he would have obtained had he used the price of the entire computer as a royalty base.  Being precluded from using the computer as the royalty base, he used the price of the software, but inflated the royalty rate accordingly.  This cannot be an acceptable way to conduct an analysis of what the parties would have agreed to in the hypothetical licensing context.

The Federal Circuit could have concluded its analysis after determining that Lucent’s evidence was insufficient to support application of the entire market value rule.  That the court went on to criticize Lucent’s damages experts’ royalty rate shows the court’s willingness to reject an arguably results-driven damages analysis that increased the royalty rate to make up for a decreased royalty base.

Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co.

Following an eight-day trial, a jury awarded damages to Cornell of approximately $184 million after finding Hewlett-Packard liable for infringing a Cornell patent concerning the manner in which computer processors process instructions.  The jury applied a 0.8% royalty rate against $23 billion in revenue that Hewlett-Packard had derived from sales of a “CPU brick” including the accused component.  In an opinion by Judge Randall R. Rader of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation in the Northern District of New York, the court reduced the damages award to approximately $53.5 million.  Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).  Judge Rader focused his analysis on the revenue base against which the 0.8% royalty rate should be applied, and concluded that the evidence did not support the jury’s damages calculation.

Cornell’s patent claims a method for instruction issuance within a computer processor.  Cornell “did not develop an entire computing system;” rather, the patent was infringed by just one component of the instruction reorder buffer (“IRB”), itself a part of a computer processor.  As Judge Rader explained, “[i]n the anatomy of a Hewlett-Packard server, the processor is the smallest salable patent-practicing unit…the claimed invention is a small part of the IRB, which is a part of a processor, which is part of a CPU module, which is part of a ‘brick,’ which is itself only a part of the larger server.”

The jury’s damages calculation, however, used as the royalty base the value of the entire CPU brick.  Cornell originally sought damages on the revenue from Hewlett-Packard’s entire server and workstation systems, which “include vast amounts of technology beyond the infringing part of the processors.”  But, the district court determined at an evidentiary hearing that Cornell had not offered “credible and sufficient economic proof that the patented invention drove demand for Hewlett-Packard’s entire server and workstation market.”  Thus, the district court excluded at trial “testimony that the entire market value of Hewlett-Packard’s servers and workstations should be used as the royalty base.”  In response, according to the court, “Cornell simply stepped one rung down the Hewlett-Packard revenue ladder from servers and workstations to the next most expensive processor-incorporating product [the CPU brick].”

As Judge Rader’s opinion explained, Cornell still failed to offer “any evidence to show a connection between consumer demand for [the CPU brick] and the patented invention.”  Indeed, “Cornell chose this [CPU brick] royalty base in favor of another alternative more clearly relevant to the value of the patented invention – the revenue Hewlett-Packard would have earned had it sold each infringing processor as just that, a processor, without any additional non-infringing components…[this] logical and readily available alternative was the smallest salable unit with close relation to the claimed invention – namely the processor itself.  Cornell nevertheless stuck to its guns, aiming for the highest royalty base still available after the court’s exclusion order.”

Ultimately, Judge Rader concluded that the record contained “no reasonable basis for finding that Cornell is entitled to the entire market value of Hewlett-Packard’s CPU bricks or servers or workstations as a reasonable royalty base.”  Instead, Judge Rader found that the processor revenue – “the smallest salable patent-practicing unit” – was an appropriate royalty base from which damages could be calculated by multiplying the 0.8% royalty rate.

IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc.

More recently, Judge Rader – this time sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Texas – excluded expert testimony because it “improperly inflate[d] both the royalty base and the royalty rate by relying on irrelevant and unreliable evidence and by failing to account for the economic realties of this claimed component as part of a larger system.”  IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-447 (RRR).  The expert had attempted to rely on the entire market value rule in identifying the royalty base; Judge Rader, however, determined that the expert’s “methodology…[did] not show a sound economic connection between the claimed invention and this broad proffered royalty base.”  In particular, Judge Rader explained that “[t]he claimed invention [a workspace switching feature] is but one relatively small component of the accused operating systems” and that the “relative importance of certain other features such as security, interoperability, and virtualization” confirm the patented invention’s “small role in the overall product.”  In addition, Judge Rader explained that the expert failed to account “for the record evidence that most users of the accused operating systems do not seem to use the workspace switching feature at all.”  He issued an order excluding the expert report and reminded the parties “that expert testimony on the topic of damages will not be allowed absent a firm basis in accepted economic principles with an eye to the facts of [the] record.”


These recent opinions show that, although the entire market value rule remains viable, if a patent owner seeks to recover damages based on revenue from an entire product or system, courts require trustworthy evidence that an infringing component drives consumer demand for the entire system.  In the absence of such evidence, courts will limit reasonable royalty damages to a royalty rate applied against only the economic contribution made by the infringing component.  And in any case, the royalty rate sought should reflect the economic realities of the infringing component as part of a larger system.  Proper patent infringement damage analyses should take into account the contribution that the patented invention has made to the revenue derived from infringing sales.

0The Perilous State of Patent Protection for Molecular Diagnostics - Part 1

Development in the era of personalized medicine depends on invention of assay technologies that predict in a presenting patient the likely development or course of disease, or suggest which drug therapies are likely to be an effective treatment.  The development of such tests, commonly referred to as “molecular diagnostics” (methodologies and compositions useful for diagnosis, prognosis or disease risk assessment), in turn depends on the patent system.  There are a number of emerging legal issues that make obtaining and enforcing claims of a scope that sufficiently protect a molecular diagnostic franchise costly, time consuming and problematic. 

Compositions of matter (reagents and kits) for predicting the onset, severity, or outcome of disease, detecting disease, or monitoring disease progression are widely patentable in the United States and abroad.  Claim types include, for example, novel nucleic acids complementary to or flanking a polymorphism, or novel antibodies that can distinguish protein variants.  In addition, claims to methods of diagnosis are routinely issued in the United States, and directly or indirectly, in many other countries.1  Whether such claims are patentable often depends upon the novelty and nonobviousness of the association, that is, on the underlying observation or discovery that a particular biomarker is an indicator of a particular phenotype.  The patentability of such claims is not based upon discovery of a particular DNA sequence or other biomarker per se, nor on the mechanics of biomarker detection.

Historically, the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has allowed, and the courts have enforced, patents directed  to molecular diagnostic inventions with a scope comparable to that of hypothetical method claim 1 set forth below.2 

A method of assessing the risk of developing disease X, the method comprising detecting the presence or absence of allele Y in a sample obtained from a patient, wherein allele Y is indicative of an increased risk of developing disease X.

The Evolution of the Meaning of Statutory Subject Matter

Not all methods fit the definition of subject matter that can be patented.  The law is that “natural phenomena” are not eligible for patent protection, although new applications of a phenomenon can be patented.  The now famous In re Bilski opinion (545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) held that not all methods are patentable: only those that are tied to a particular machine, or transform an article (the “machine-or-transformation test”).   This, if it is indeed the law (a decision on appeal argued at the U.S. Supreme Court is pending), is a substantive change from prior jurisprudence, the scope and application of which currently is unknown. 

The invention at issue in Bilski related to a business method (managing financial risks), but the issue whether the Bilski holding will restrict the patentable scope of diagnostic method claims remains unsettled.  Under Bilski, a method can be patentable if it “transforms an article” and the  transformation is “central to the purpose of the claimed process.”  Bilski warns that “insignificant extra-solution activity” will not rescue a method claim which fails to transform and is otherwise unpatentable. 

Bilski, and other recent decisions raises questions such as: Do claims such as claim 1 above satisfy the Bilski test?  What is “insignificant extra-solution activity” and what steps when added to a claim are significant? Do such claims illegally claim natural phenomena?

Many diagnostic methods can be recast as therapeutic methods performed on diagnosed patients, through claims such as:

A method of treating or preventing disease X, the method comprising administering a therapeutic [selected from an appropriate list] to a person identified as carrying allele Y.

Because a treatment method acts on a person, presumably involves a real “transformation” and is presumably “significant” extra solution activity, such a claim arguably complies with the machine-or-transformation test, and provides reasonable coverage for a personalized medicine approach.   Nevertheless, in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, a district court held that the addition of an immunizing step to a method of determining an immunization schedule was insignificant extra-solution activity; the claim was therefore held invalid as directed to unpatentable subject matter on the premise that the claims allegedly attempted “to patent an unpatentable natural phenomenon.”  The invalidity of the Classen claims was affirmed on appeal in a succinct, non-precedential opinion stating:

Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus’ nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’ Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954. Therefore we affirm.

In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (“LabCorp”), the Supreme Court very nearly decided whether broad diagnostic claims are unpatentable attempts to claim phenomena of nature or mere mental steps.  Initially, the court accepted review of the case, but later changed its mind and dismissed the appeal as “improvidently granted” without opinion even though briefing and oral arguments had been completed.  Justice Breyer, disagreeing with the court’s belated decision to dismiss the writ, took the opportunity to express the views of a minority of the court, offering that, if he were to decide the case, he would hold the claim unpatentable as amounting to “a simple natural correlation, i.e., a ‘natural phenomenon.’”  Importantly, the Supreme Court did not decide the case.  It is not binding precedent and does not necessarily provide any indication of how the Supreme Court would have ruled.

Another case addressing these disturbing issues is Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Svcs. (S.D. Cal. 2008).  The district court ruled that a claim to a “method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy” impermissibly claimed nonstatutory subject matter.  The claim involves administering a drug and determining 6-thioguanine levels in the subject and making “correlations between certain thiopurine drug metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy and toxicity.”  The court held that “said correlations are natural phenomena,” and therefore the claims are invalid as they wholly pre-empt the use of a natural phenomenon, noting:

“[b]ecause the claims cover the correlations themselves, it follows that the claims “wholly pre-empt” the correlations.”

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Prometheus claims satisfied the Bilski standard:

We conclude that the methods of treatment claimed in the patents in suit squarely fall within the realm of patentable subject matter because they “transform an article into a different state or thing,” and this transformation is “central to the purpose of the claimed process.

*          *          *

[T]he determining step, which is present in each of the asserted claims, is also transformative and central to the claimed methods.  Determining the levels of 6-TG or 6-MMP in a subject necessarily involves a transformation, for those levels cannot be determined by mere inspection.

This encouraging Federal Circuit opinion signaled that molecular diagnostic method claims likely would be interpreted to be statutory and to fall within the constraints of Bilski, and gave practitioners a template claim format and set of principles that could guide claim drafting. 

But this spring, an inferior court issued yet another opinion undercutting patentability of diagnostic method claims.  According to the court in Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (case 09-cv-04515-RWS, Southern District of New York, March 29, 2010), Myriad Genetics’ patent claims covering the BRCA-1 breast cancer assays, directed toward clinical analysis for a biochemical marker for the purpose of diagnosis or for influencing therapy, are per se invalid because they constitute illegal patenting of a “mental step” and cover a natural phenomenon.  All steps conducted pre-comparison are “no more than data gathering steps” and can’t save the claims.  Authority for the court’s holding is primarily the Bilski decision.  Justice Breyer’s remarks in his dissent in LabCorp are referenced with approval.  Prometheus is “distinguished.”  The court held that whereas in Prometheus, where the claim requiring “determining” [the level of the marker in the sample]  was “transformative” and therefore statutory, the Myriad method claims required only “comparing and analyzing” and this was characterized as not transformative, but rather as an abstract mental processes.  Myriad has announced it will appeal.  Seasoned practitioners opine that the holding cannot stand, but of course this is the purview of the appeals court.

It appears that the permissible scope of diagnostic methods necessarily is depending on the outcome of patent litigation currently on appeal.  Diagnostic method claims may in the future be restricted in scope to require the use of a particular machine or reagent, or the transformation of an article or of data representing an article.  Well drafted applications should hedge against these contingencies by presenting diverse claims of varying scope.  Gaining effective protection for such molecular diagnostic developments requires advice from experts informed and thoughtful about this rapidly changing legal framework.

0Options for Intellectual Property Litigation Against Foreign Entities

In the right circumstances, U.S. businesses can enforce their intellectual property against foreign companies through litigation in the United States.  In particular, intellectual property enforcement actions against foreign businesses filed at the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) and in U.S. district courts can be highly effective.  An understanding of the benefits and limitations of actions filed in the ITC and in district courts is important both for U.S. companies considering how to enforce their intellectual property rights against foreign businesses and for foreign companies that have been threatened with litigation or find themselves defending intellectual property cases in the United States. 

Jurisdictional Hurdles

The subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts to hear cases involving U.S. intellectual property rights asserted against foreign companies is limited.  As a general rule, subject matter jurisdiction exists only where an infringing act took place in the United States.  For example, the jurisdiction of the ITC is specifically limited to cases involving the importation of articles alleged to infringe U.S. intellectual property.  Similarly, jurisdiction of district courts in patent cases usually is predicated on a party making, using, offering to sell, selling within the United States or importing into the United States a patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  But, in certain circumstances, the subject matter jurisdiction of district courts is more expansive.  For example, a U.S. company may bring a lawsuit in a district court against a company that supplies or causes to be supplied from the United States components of a patented invention intended to be combined abroad. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).  In other words, a U.S. company can seek redress for infringement of its U.S. patents in a U.S. district court even if the infringing product is assembled overseas and does not re-enter the United States.  Similarly, subject matter jurisdiction for trade secret misappropriation may exist in a U.S. district court when the trade secret was misappropriated from the United States, even if products incorporating the trade secrets were never sold, offered for sale or used in the United States. 

While the subject matter jurisdiction of the ITC to hear cases involving intellectual property infringement is more circumscribed than that of district courts, personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants is necessary in district courts but not in the ITC.  In a district court, personal jurisdiction must be established over each and every defendant and service abroad must often be accomplished pursuant to the Hague Convention.  Depending on the nationality of the parties involved, the personal jurisdiction and service requirements of district courts can raise obstacles to filing suit and lead to months of delay.  In contrast, the ITC has in rem jurisdiction over the imported products accused of infringement, and a default judgment and exclusion order can be entered against a respondent even if the respondent never appears in the ITC. Sealed Air Corp. v. ITC, 645 F.2d 976, 987 (1981). 

Time to Trial

One important distinction between actions filed in the ITC and in district courts is the swift pace of ITC litigation.  In the ITC, the entire discovery period is typically about six months (with only 10 days to respond to interrogatories and document requests).  Additionally, a trial before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) typically occurs in less than a year, and the entire investigative process, including review of the ALJ’s decision by the Commission, is usually 15 to 16 months from institution.  In contrast, the median time to trial for a patent litigation in 2009 in the 20 district courts where patent lawsuits were most commonly filed was 25 months.1  A related speed advantage is that the ITC generally will not stay an investigation pending reexamination of patents-in-suit, whereas district courts grant stays to patent defendants over half the time when the asserted patents are placed into reexamination.2

The Decision Makers

The Seventh Amendment codifies the right to a jury trial in civil cases filed in district courts.  Trial success rates for patent holders are much higher in cases decided by juries as compared to bench trials, and patent owners unsurprisingly exercise their right to jury trials in district courts almost as a matter of course.  In the ITC, however, there are no jury proceedings.  ITC hearings are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge who functions like a district court judge in a bench trial.  As a practical matter, the unavailability of a jury in the ITC may not make much of a difference as the success rates in the ITC and in district courts for patent holders who file cases in both venues is nearly identical.3  However, the types of cases that can realistically be adjudicated by a jury in a district court and an ALJ in the ITC may differ.  Almost all cases heard by ALJs at the ITC involve intellectual property, which enables them to develop expertise in that area of the law.  Consequently, the ALJs are capable of adjudicating multi-patent suits involving several different technologies.  On the other hand, the challenges inherent in presenting complex issues involving many patents on several different technologies to a lay jury may necessitate bifurcated jury trials, which can delay final resolution. 


From the perspective of both U.S. businesses and their foreign competitors, the most important difference between intellectual property actions filed in the ITC and in district courts may be the remedies available in each forum.  In the ITC, unlike in district courts, money damages are not available.  Instead, a prevailing party in the ITC will typically obtain an exclusion order.  ITC exclusion orders come in two forms:  general exclusion orders apply against anyone importing the infringing products, but are available only in limited circumstances;4 limited exclusion orders only apply against respondents found to infringe.  In addition to an exclusion order, the ITC generally issues cease and desist orders against domestic respondents, prohibiting the sale, distribution or use of infringing products in the United States. 

If a U.S. company is interested in obtaining injunctive relief against a foreign entity infringing its intellectual property or interested in the settlement leverage this relief provides, a lawsuit in the ITC makes good sense.  The Supreme Court’s eBay decision does not apply in the ITC, and the ITC therefore need not weigh the four factors used to determine if an injunction should issue before issuing exclusion or cease and desist orders.5  Moreover, if a complainant obtains a general exclusion order in the ITC, which is more likely to be awarded in trademark and grey market goods cases, that order is much broader than the injunctive relief available in a district court.  If, on the other hand, the objective of an enforcement action brought by a U.S. business is the recovery of monetary damages, the only available option is a district court action.

Filing In Both Venues

Many complainants file concurrent lawsuits in both the ITC and in a U.S. district court.  For example, in a lawsuit that garnered a great deal of media attention, Apple recently filed concurrent lawsuits against HTC, a Taiwanese smartphone maker, in the ITC and in U.S. District Court in Delaware on 20 Apple patents related to the iPhone.6  In most instances, rather than fight similar cases on two fronts, defendants will seek to stay the case filed by the patent plaintiff in district court pending the outcome of the ITC investigation.  Such stays are automatic so long as the defendant requests the stay within 30 days of the later of being named as a respondent in the ITC investigation or the filing of the district court action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a).  Stays will remain in place until the ITC case is final, which includes all appeals. 


U.S. companies considering how to enforce their intellectual property rights against foreign businesses must be aware at the outset of litigation of the important distinctions between actions in the ITC and in district courts.  If the primary goal of a U.S. entity is to swiftly shut down the importation of infringing goods, the ITC is the logical venue.  Because there is no need for personal jurisdiction and service need not be made pursuant to the Hague Convention, a lawsuit can be commenced without delay.  Time to trial in the ITC is very short, and injunctive relief to the prevailing plaintiff is awarded as a matter of course.  If, on the other hand, the intellectual property holder wishes to try its case before a jury, recover monetary damages or knows that the eBay four-factor test will not be an obstacle to obtaining desired injunctive relief, a district court may be the appropriate venue.  Additionally, particular district courts may offer special advantages.  For example, a lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of Virginia is sensible for companies seeking speedy relief since the median time to trial in patent cases is even less than in the ITC.  A company may also choose to file in the district court where the company is headquartered if this is perceived as a strategic advantage. 

0Publications and Events


“What Is the Bilski Invention?”
June 11, 2010
Author: Stephen Schreiner

An IP Lawyer Gets Tough on Crime with Pro Bono Experience
IP Litigator
March/April 2010
Author: Andrew Stein


ACI’s Life Sciences Compliance Bootcamp
June 28, 2010
New York, NY

This American Conference Institute event will provide in-house counsel and executives - at varying levels - a broad and in-depth understanding of the infrastructure of compliance and insights into how compliance will be affected by new legislation and new and ongoing civil and criminal enforcement actions. Jackie Klosek will present the “Key Privacy Considerations for Any Life Sciences Compliance Program” session.

ActiveState: Best Practices in Managing Open Source Intellectual Property in the Enterprise
June 29, 2010

Silicon Alley Accelerators – Investor Screening Committee
June 29-30, 2010; September 28-29, 2010
Goodwin Procter's New York Office

Silicon Alley Accelerators brings together investors and early-stage technology companies in the New York area. These two-day events will feature presentations from early-stage companies to investors followed by a networking dinner reception.

PLI: Understanding Patent Law 2010
July 14, 2010
PLI New York Center – New York, NY

This program will address patent issues that may arise in the context of general law practice and business management, as well as issues that are unique to patent law in other contexts such as mergers and acquisitions and in licensing transactions. Robert Crawford will speak on “Patent Issues in Transactions.”