Major U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Cases Decided in 2025

Looking Ahead to 2026

The U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals issued a number of significant rulings in 2025 that reshaped the landscape for agency authority and judicial review. Notably, the Supreme Court rejected universal injunctions and reiterated that district courts should not automatically defer to agency interpretations of federal statutes in certain circumstances. The Courts of Appeals also considered issues that will impact the consumer finance industry, including with respect to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), consumer privacy laws, and the federal preemption limits under statutes such as the National Bank Act. Further, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed to hear an appeal concerning what requirements, if any, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) may impose on financial institutions to investigate and reimburse consumers alleging claims based on fraudulent online wire transfer schemes. These decisions suggest that consumer finance companies need to prepare for more fragmented regulatory compliance and potentially inconsistent rulings across jurisdictions.

Additionally, while the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) acting director, Russell Vought, recently agreed to request funding for the CFPB for at least the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) recently heard argument concerning whether to uphold the district court’s preliminary injunction stopping terminations of most of the CFPB’s staff, the canceling of contracts, and other actions. The D.C. Circuit’s ruling, and any appeal, has the potential to further overhaul the federal regulatory and enforcement space and responsible agencies over at least the next several years.

In the News

U.S. Supreme Court

Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Judicial Review Under Hobbs Act

In June 2025, the Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Orders Review Act (the Hobbs Act), which provides for pre-enforcement judicial review of certain agencies’ orders, “does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute,” including the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of the TCPA, in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. et al. In so doing, the Court rejected the theory that “the Hobbs Act’s grant of ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ to courts of appeals to ‘determine the validity’ of agency orders” precludes “district courts in enforcement proceedings from independently assessing whether an agency’s interpretation” of a statute “is correct.” Consistent with last year’s ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Court held that district courts must independently interpret statutes “under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.”

Supreme Court Limits Universal Injunctions

Also in June 2025, the Supreme Court decided Trump v. CASA, Inc., a highly anticipated decision addressing the use of universal injunctive relief — injunctions that prohibit the enforcement of a law or policy against anyone as opposed to only the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Noting that universal injunctions have no “founding-era” analogue, the Court concluded that such injunctions “likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts” and granted the government’s application for a stay “only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” This ruling may increase the frequency of class action filings seeking statewide or nationwide injunctive relief, a lawful alternative the Court acknowledged in its ruling.

Supreme Court Declines to Hear Case Concerning Whether Federal Class Actions Can Include Uninjured Class Members

In June 2025, the Supreme Court declined to issue a substantive ruling in an appeal questioning whether or to what extent the presence of uninjured class members may preclude a finding of predominance when plaintiffs seek to certify a class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) — which is not an uncommon issue in class actions involving consumer finance companies. The case, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis, involved a class of visually impaired plaintiffs who alleged that Labcorp’s self-service appointment check-in “kiosks violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.” The Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in which it reiterated its view that Rule 23 does not preclude class certification even if the class “includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members.” 

After certiorari was granted, the plaintiffs argued that Labcorp had taken its appeal from the wrong district court order and that, because the Ninth Circuit had held that all class members suffered an injury, the question presented fell outside the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The Court ultimately agreed, concluded that certiorari had been “improvidently granted,” and dismissed the appeal. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, however, stating that “the Ninth Circuit’s decision is incorrect under Rule 23 and this Court’s precedents, and it will generate serious real-world consequences.” The Court may seek another vehicle to address the question, given that Laboratory Corp. is the second time it set out to do so. In the interim, a split of authority persists among the Courts of Appeals on how to handle classes defined to include uninjured members, with some deeming it fatal, others deeming it not a problem at all, and others staking a middle ground turning on precisely how many uninjured members there are and how feasible it will be to weed them out before final judgment.

Courts of Appeals

Eleventh Circuit Strikes Down FCC’s “One-to-One Consent” Rule

In January 2025, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struck down the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) “one-to-one consent” rule, which prohibited telemarketing and advertising robocalls to a consumer unless that consumer “consent[ed] to calls from only one entity at a time” and “consent[ed] only to calls” with subject matters “associated with the interaction that prompted the consent,” in Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC. The Eleventh Circuit held that the FCC only has statutory authority to “‘implement’ the TCPA” and the plain language of “the TCPA requires only ‘prior express consent’—not ‘prior express consent’ plus” (emphasis in original). Thus, the court reasoned that the one-to-one consent rule “impermissibly alter[ed] what it means to give ‘prior express consent.’” The FCC did not appeal this decision and, in August 2025, it formally reinstated the previous definition of “prior express written consent,” eliminating one of the plaintiffs’ bar’s arguments for strict individualized authorization. 

Fourth Circuit Reverses Class Certification and Damages for Lack of Standing

In January 2025, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit conclusively held that “to recover damages from the defendants, ‘[e]very class member must have Article III standing’ ‘for each claim that they press,’ requiring proof that the challenged conduct caused each of them a concrete harm” (emphasis in original), in Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC. The court emphasized that plaintiffs cannot establish standing to recover damages by relying “on a ‘mere risk of future harm.’” Accordingly, because “the plaintiffs’ class-wide showing” was “too speculative,” the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, certifying a class and awarding that class damages, and directed that the action proceed “only as to the individual named plaintiffs.”

Eleventh Circuit Concludes Convenience Fees Can Violate the FDCPA

In February 2025, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) “prohibits loan servicers from collecting ‘pay-to-pay’ or ‘convenience’ fees for the use of certain payment methods” in Glover v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. The plaintiffs alleged that Ocwen acquired servicing rights to the plaintiffs’ “mortgages after they defaulted on their loans” and offered them “the option to make expedited payments over the phone or online […] for an additional convenience fee.” The plaintiffs alleged these fees were not permitted because they were not expressly named in the plaintiffs’ mortgages or promissory notes. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment for the plaintiffs and held that “a debt collector violates the FDCPA when they charge ‘any amount’ which is not expressly authorized by the agreement or permitted by law while collecting or attempting to collect a debt.”

Seventh Circuit Narrows Meaning of “Telephone Solicitation” Under the TCPA 

In March 2025, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that, to fall within the TCPA’s definition of “telephone solicitation,” a call or text must be made “with the purpose of persuading or urging someone to pay for property, goods, or services,” not merely to provide information or promote free programs or services, in Hulce v. Zipongo Inc. The Seventh Circuit went on to note that the person “the caller intends to encourage is also the party who makes the purchasing decision” because the court “cannot separate the encouragement element from the purchasing element.” The court prefaced that its ruling was narrow and cautioned against the creation of “a sweeping loophole within the prohibition of telephone solicitations.”

Second Circuit Confirms “Reasonable Investigation” Standard for FCRA Claims

In May 2025, the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment and held that the defendant, Credit One Bank, satisfied the FCRA by conducting a “reasonable investigation” in Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA. It also held that although there was a genuine dispute as to whether the plaintiff was responsible for the account based on fraud, a reasonable investigation into the plaintiff’s claim would not have led to a different conclusion. The plaintiff had alleged that Credit One Bank “failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into her dispute” because she claimed her mother committed identity theft against her and the bank’s investigation did not confirm any identity theft. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that “FCRA does not require furnishers to conduct perfect investigations -- it requires only that furnishers conduct reasonable investigations” and it “does not guarantee that the results of those investigations will favor the consumer lodging the dispute.” The court then affirmed summary judgment for Credit One Bank, finding that the investigation was reasonable and, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could conclude that the purported violation was willful or negligent so as to entitle the plaintiff to damages.

Second Circuit Agrees to Hear Citibank’s EFTA Appeal

In September 2025, the Second Circuit granted Citibank’s request for interlocutory appeal in a case filed by New York Attorney General (AG) Letitia James. In January 2024, AG James accused Citibank of failing to protect and reimburse customers who lost money to fraudulent online wire transfer schemes. One year later, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed key claims in the case to proceed, including those under the EFTA. Citibank requested an interlocutory review of this order. The New York AG’s claims allege that Citibank failed to comply with EFTA requirements after receiving customer reports of scam activity in their online accounts. Citibank counters that wire transfers are carved out from the EFTA and are instead governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which imposes less stringent reimbursement requirements. In granting Citibank’s request for interlocutory review, the Second Circuit also granted requests from nonparties to file amici curiae briefs. Briefing is scheduled to conclude in March 2026, and the court will hear argument in April 2026.

First Circuit Concludes National Bank Act Does Not Preempt Rhode Island Law

In September 2025, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the National Bank Act did not preempt a Rhode Island statute that required mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts in Conti v. Citizens Bank, NA. Citizens Bank argued that the Rhode Island statute should be preempted because it forces the bank to “comply with a patchwork of varying and conflicting state regulations concerning the payment of interest on mortgage-escrow accounts.” The First Circuit disagreed and, after conducting the preemption analysis the Supreme Court outlined in Cantero v. Bank of America, NA, it found “no express conflict between the Rhode Island statute and the National Bank Act” and found that Citizens Bank did not establish that the state law would “significantly interfere” with the exercise of its federal-banking powers. This ruling will likely increase compliance obligations as national banks will need to carefully review varying state laws regarding escrow accounts and potentially other consumer financial products.

Tenth Circuit Limits Federal Preemption: Colorado May Enforce Interest Rate Caps After DIDA Opt Out

In November 2025, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered the meaning of “loans made in such State” as used in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA) of 1980 opt-out provision in National Association of Industrial Bankers v. Weiser. DIDA “sets a national standard for interest rates that state-chartered banks may charge on loans” and permits a state to “opt out of this national standard for ‘loans made in such State,’” meaning the “state reasserts authority to regulate interest rates on these types of loans.” Three trade associations with state-bank members brought an action against Colorado’s AG alleging that Colorado’s interest rate caps did not apply to loans made by out-of-state banks to Colorado borrowers. As “an issue of first impression,” the Tenth Circuit determined that the phrase “‘loans made in such State’ refers to loans in which either the lender or the borrower is located in the opt-out state.” Because Colorado had opted out of the federal statute, “that statute no longer preempts Colorado’s interest-rate caps for loans from out-of-state banks to Colorado borrowers.”

Fourth Circuit Deepens Circuit Split on Standing Burden in Data Breach Lawsuits

In October 2025, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the public disclosure of a plaintiff’s personal information in a data breach incident was sufficient to show they suffered a “concrete injury” in Holmes v. Elephant Insurance Company. Specifically, the court held that showing that the plaintiffs’ driver’s license numbers appeared on the dark web could establish standing to seek damages since the “injury ha[d] already come to pass.” However, for the plaintiffs whose personal information was breached but not publicly disclosed, the Fourth Circuit held that the risk that their personal information “may be misused in the future” was not sufficient to establish standing because “they have not alleged facts showing that any particular misuse is imminent.” In contrast, the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have found imminent injury sufficient to show standing when personal information was compromised in an incident.

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Read the first chapter of the report, “Emerging Issues and What to Watch for in 2026.”