From January 2024 through September 2026, 30 new public REIT M&A transactions were announced (including 25 in the final 15 months of that period), with an aggregate transaction value of approximately $151 billion. The transactions spanned 10 property sectors, led by residential (six), industrial and mortgage (five each), and retail and healthcare (four each), with office, lodging, self-storage, timber, and diversified also represented. While the median transaction value was a relatively modest $2.2 billion, the period also produced two of the three largest REIT business combination transactions to date, including the $69 billion merger of equals between AvalonBay Communities and Equity Residential.

We are pleased to share in this article our findings with respect to the terms of these 30 transactions, as well as our thoughts on the outlook for REIT and real estate sector M&A in late 2026 and beyond.1 A full listing of the reviewed transactions is included at the end of this article, which includes four acquisitions by US buyers of REITs listed in London or Toronto.2

Selected Data of the 30 New REIT M&A Transactions Announced Since January 1, 2024

13 (43%) were public-to-public transactions
17 (57%) were go-private transactions
3 (10%) involved the acquisition of non-exchange-traded public REITs
11 (37%) of the 27 publicly traded targets had a history of recent activist investor campaigns
19 (63%) provided for all-cash consideration
8 (27%) provided for all-stock consideration
3 (10%) provided for mixed cash and stock consideration
31.3% was the average premium (and 29.7% the median premium) to unaffected share price for the 16 all-cash transactions involving publicly traded targets, with a high of 60.0% and a low of 12.3%
21.8% was the average premium (and 24.5% the median premium) to unaffected share price for the 8 all-stock or mixed cash-and-stock transactions involving publicly traded targets, with a high of 39.0% and a low of 8.3% (excluding MOE)
4 (13%) involved targets listed outside the United States (2 on the London Stock Exchange and 2 on the Toronto Stock Exchange), each acquired by a US buyer
7 (23%) included either “go-shop” or “window-shop” two-tiered termination fee provisions, whereby a substantially lower fee (an average 1.8% of transaction equity value) was payable during the go-shop or window-shop period, compared with an average 3.6% of transaction equity value (or approximately 1.8% of enterprise value) for termination fees payable outside the go-shop or window-shop period or under single-tier provisions
8 (32%) of the 25 equity REIT transactions required the target to facilitate pre-closing (or simultaneous with closing) sales of select assets or other restructurings as designated by buyer
14 (47%) included a reverse termination fee payable by the buyer upon a failure to close (including as a result of a financing failure), averaging 9.6% of transaction equity value (approximately 5.4% of enterprise value)

Key Takeaways

  • A Slow Start, a Surge, and a Pause. REIT M&A remains acutely sensitive to the cost and availability of capital, and windows of opportunity can open and close quickly. The historic surge in interest rates during 2022 – 2023 brought go-private activity in the public REIT sector nearly to a halt. Activity remained sparse through 2024, with a small handful of significant public-to-public mergers announced during this period. Beginning in mid-2025, however, M&A activity accelerated sharply. 25 of the 30 transactions in our sample were announced from July 2025 onward, including 15 to date in 2026 alone with an aggregate transaction value of approximately $106 billion. However, the recent renewed spike in Treasury yields, to levels not seen in more than two decades, has prompted many market participants to hit pause going into the final quarter of 2026.
  • Private Capital Leading the Charge. Go-private transactions and all-cash consideration, which had all but disappeared in our 2022 – 2023 sample, returned in force, accounting for more than half of all transactions announced since the beginning of 2024. The “big two” effect of Blackstone and Brookfield that we first observed in our 2019 update was again on display, with each firm participating in multiple REIT take-privates. Moreover, the buyer universe in take-privates is considerably deeper than in prior cycles, with a variety of alternative asset managers and private credit platforms, sovereign wealth and pension funds, insurance capital, and large private operators all participating in public REIT transactions during this period, frequently in consortiums or alongside co-investors. The average premium to unaffected stock price in the take-private transactions during the covered period was 31.3%, compared with 21.8% for the all-stock and mixed-consideration transactions. With private real estate fundraising continuing to far outpace public REIT capital raising,3 we expect private capital to remain the principal source of take-private transactions.
  • Persistent Discounts Drive Exits. A common thread in many of the go-private transactions was the persistent gap between public market pricing and private market values. According to S&P Global Market Intelligence, US publicly traded REITs closed the first quarter of 2026 at a median discount of 19.3% to consensus NAV, with office, timber, and hotel REITs at the widest discounts.4 A REIT whose shares trade below the value of its assets finds it difficult to grow by issuing equity without diluting its existing shareholders. This public market-to-private valuation dislocation also creates complexity with raising necessary capital to fund growth. Target company disclosures in our sample were unusually candid on this point, invariably noting that the quality of the company’s assets was being significantly mispriced in the public markets and that the high cost of capital did not support accretive growth.

    The challenge is particularly acute at smaller REITs. Because a significant number of publicly traded US equity REITs now have market capitalizations of $2 billion or less, this leaves “a number of sub-scale, cost of capital disadvantaged platforms” trying to compete and a growing valuation discrepancy between the “scaled haves and the sub-scale have-nots.”5 Echoing a theme from our 2023 alert, high-quality portfolios trading at a discount continue to attract discerning buyers. 18 of the 30 transactions in our data set had a transaction value of $2.5 billion or less.
  • Scale Matters: The Return of the Strategic Merger. Conversely, stock-for-stock M&A remains an active option for public REITs to achieve fundamental growth realized through the synergies of such transactions. Though slightly fewer in number than the take-privates, strategic buyer deals, most of them for stock or mixed consideration, accounted for the majority of aggregate deal value across our sample set, including the merger of equals between AvalonBay Communities and Equity Residential, which created a combined company with an enterprise value of approximately $69 billion at signing and which represents the largest REIT business combination ever completed. These transactions were driven predominantly by the pursuit of scale: a larger and more liquid equity base, greater index weighting, G&A and operating synergies, and a lower cost of capital, driving access to more attractive capital raising in the future.
  • Activism and Unsolicited Bids. Activism remains a defining feature of the REIT landscape and is often a precursor to M&A. A significant number of the publicly traded targets in our sample had a recent history of activist campaigns. In our January 2026 review of REIT activism,6 we observed that the REIT sector ranked among the industries most frequently targeted by activists over the past five years, with roughly 100 public campaigns and related engagements launched since 2020, most of them at small- and mid-cap REITs and especially at REITs trading at discounts to NAV. About half of those campaigns pushed for a sale of the company or a strategic review, and about a fifth were launched in connection with, or in support of, proposed M&A or an unsolicited bid. REITs’ structural defenses, including charter ownership limits that typically cap any single holder at 9.8% absent a board waiver and the defensive tools that Maryland law affords the many REITs organized there, may make hostile takeovers more challenging in the sector, but activists can be successful in generating public pressure campaigns designed to push boards toward a strategic review or negotiated sale. Activists have also pressed the “liquidation thesis,” arguing that shareholders would realize more value from a sale of the portfolio and distribution of the proceeds than from the company’s continued operation, and they have increasingly targeted announced deals, as well as independent targets, with this type of campaign. Boards should assume that a persistent discount to NAV is likely to attract attention and should refresh their activism preparedness, including a review of their governing documents and structural defenses, as well as preemptive exercises of how an unsolicited approach or activist campaign might unfold, well before one emerges.
  • Cross-Border Deal Dynamics. Four of the 30 transactions involved US buyers of target REITs listed outside the United States, two in London and two in Toronto, and foreign sovereign wealth, pension, and insurance capital participated as buyers or co-investors in several US take-privates. Cross-border transactions bring somewhat different procedural rule sets to the table, particularly when a foreign jurisdiction’s takeover code applies to a transaction. These statutory frameworks may impose enhanced disclosure obligations, restrictions on taking certain “frustrating” corporate actions when a target company is in receipt of an M&A proposal, statutory voting requirements that differ from those in the US, and court-mandated regulatory closing conditions. US acquirers considering foreign-based targets should build these frameworks into their deal planning, timetable, and tactics from the outset. We also expect US REITs to continue to look abroad for scale and foreign capital to continue to look to the US public markets for opportunities.
  • Transform, Then Sell. A striking number of transactions were the culmination of multiyear portfolio transformations. Several targets spent years simplifying into pure-play portfolios — exiting noncore property types (often in the office sector), nonstrategic assets, or secondary markets — before selling. Their experience bears out the conventional wisdom that a focused portfolio broadens the universe of potential M&A buyers. Spinoffs can serve a similar purpose: Separating a noncore portfolio into a separately listed company can leave a cleaner, more marketable core business and, in some cases, yield two potential targets rather than one.
  • Creative Structuring. As in prior periods, a significant number of transactions included nontraditional structural elements, many of them designed to bridge valuation gaps or accommodate a broader range of capital. These included preclosing portfolio sales to separate buyers, whole-portfolio sales followed by a plan of liquidation, and a strategic/private hybrid in which a REIT acquired part of a target’s portfolio directly and the balance through a joint venture with a private investor. These structures can unlock higher overall value where no single buyer will pay full value for the whole company, reduce the size of the equity check, and match different parts of a portfolio with the buyers that value them most. Joint venture structures can also help manage property tax reassessment and transfer tax costs, such as California Proposition 13 reassessments triggered by a change in ownership, including by allocating high-cost assets to a joint venture so that those costs are shared rather than borne solely by the buyer. But each additional buyer adds a layer of execution risk as multiple transaction closing steps are often negotiated as cross-conditions to closing, and proceeds in a liquidation are future estimates set at a range, not a fixed price, and subject to distribution reserve deductions.
  • UPREIT Considerations. For targets with an UPREIT (or DownREIT) structure, preexisting property contributors protected by tax protection agreements can materially affect pricing and structure of potential transactions.7 Conversely, for a REIT not organized as an UPREIT, a merger can provide a path into that structure, including by way of merger with an existing UPREIT. In go-private transactions, OP units are most often cashed out at the common share price, and in stock-for-stock deals, target OP units are commonly rolled into acquirer OP units, preserving tax deferral. In our October 2026 alert on UPREIT go-privates, we noted that because “there is generally no way for an outside party to determine from publicly available information whether tax protection agreements are in place,” buyers need “robust tax diligence early in the transaction process.” We also advised that target boards “should defer discussions regarding the treatment of LTIP units and OP contributor interests until after pricing of the M&A transaction has been agreed upon” to preempt arguments that value was shifted away from public shareholders. Robust early diligence allows buyers to assess the overall pricing model of REIT targets when proposing merger consideration.
  • Public Strategic Reviews: A Double-Edged Sword. Many transactions were the culmination of publicly disclosed strategic alternatives reviews, which can cut both ways. A public review can draw a deep field of buyers, but it also puts the company “in play,” and if no whole-company bid materializes at an acceptable price, the impact on market price is often significant, forcing a target into an alternative exit. The fallback is often a portfolio sale and plan of liquidation. Liquidations carry their own execution risk; in at least one case in our sample, the liquidating REIT reduced its estimated distributions more than once and ultimately fell short of the range it first announced. Boards weighing the cost-benefit of publicly disclosing a sale process should be clear-eyed about the alternatives if the process does not produce a whole-company bid, and they should consider whether a confidential process would better preserve their options and avoid the risks of market price dislocation.
  • Certainty Can Beat Price. “Certainty of close” is a critical deciding factor for public-company sellers, sometimes even at the expense of a potentially higher price.8 In at least three transactions in our 2024–2026 sample set, the target board accepted a lower headline price in exchange for greater certainty of closing. These cases are the exception rather than the rule, but they are instructive. One board selected a lower bid over a higher proposal from a financial sponsor that had not demonstrated committed equity financing. Another target board stood by a signed all-cash merger even after a competing bidder returned with a higher headline proposal payable in stock. The highest headline price will often carry the day, but sophisticated sellers may look past price where execution risk is high, financing is uncommitted, or, in the case of stock consideration, the buyer’s share price does not align with the target board’s view of the buyer’s intrinsic value. In all-cash, leveraged privatization transactions, sellers expect fully executed debt and/or equity commitment letters, a limited guarantee from creditworthy sources at signing, and no financing conditions to closing. A bid without those components is, as a practical matter, dead on arrival, whatever its headline price.
  • The Universe of Publicly Traded REITs Is Consolidating. Together, the rush of recent go-private transactions and strategic combinations have steadily reduced the number of listed REITs, even as the sector’s aggregate market capitalization has grown. Nareit notes that the number of listed REITs fell from 223 at the end of 2020 to 189 in 2026.9 To be sure, the listed REIT universe also contracted during the consolidation and take-private waves of the late 1990s and 2000s, falling from roughly 210 listed REITs in 1998 to about 150 by 2008 before new listings, spinoffs, and REIT conversions rebuilt it over the following decade. In the current cycle, however, IPOs and public spinoffs have not kept pace with the issuers that have exited.
  • Termination Fees Hold Steady; Go-Shops Stay Quiet. Target termination fees held steady at approximately 3.6% of transaction equity value (approximately 1.8% of enterprise value) on average, consistent with our 2022 – 2023 findings and above our long-term historical median of 3.0%. Roughly a quarter of the transactions included two-tiered fee structures through a go-shop or window-shop, with a substantially lower fee (typically about half the full fee) during those initial periods. These were largely all-cash/go-private transactions where the target board used the go-shop or window-shop as a post-signing market check. None of the go-shop processes in our sample produced a topping bid, while the only successful interloper across all transactions in the period emerged in a deal with no go-shop at all. This reinforces our earlier observation that while go-shop provisions remain common in REIT M&A, their effectiveness in producing a higher price is limited.10 Interested bidders will surface where a value gap exists, with or without a formal invitation, and a well-run pre-signing private market check generally remains the best protection for a target board.

Outlook

  • Rates Will Set the Pace, But the Drivers Remain in Place. The sharp rise in Treasury yields in the fall of 2026 has, for now, slowed new deal-making as buyers and sellers recalibrate pricing. But the forces that powered the 2025 – 2026 M&A surge remain firmly in place: deep pools of private capital seeking to deploy, persistent valuation gaps at many public REITs, a growing premium on scale, and boards that are increasingly willing to transact. Once rates stabilize, we expect buyers and sellers to return to the table quickly, much as they did in mid-2025.
  • Process Discipline Wins. Once a REIT is in play, outcomes can turn on certainty of execution as much as headline price. Target boards should expect continued activism and unsolicited approaches, run robust pre-signing market checks to maximize price, insist on committed financing and meaningful reverse termination fees for financing or regulatory failure, and prepare in advance for the possibility that a public review does not produce a whole-company bid. Buyers, in turn, should be ready to move quickly with fully committed capital and a clear path to closing.
  • Deep-Discount Names Remain in Play. While some market observers have noted that the average REIT discount to NAV narrowed in the second half of 2026 (e.g., to roughly 10% versus the 15 – 30% range of recent years11), that average masks wide dispersion. At least 30 REITs reportedly trade at discounts to NAV of 20% or more, including nine with market capitalizations of at least $3 billion that trade at discounts of 30% or more, and where discounts are that wide, they can outweigh higher financing costs. With private capital continuing to outpace public equity raising, we expect alternative asset managers and sovereign wealth, pension, and insurance capital to keep taking smaller and mid-cap REITs private.
  • Premium-Valued REITs as Buyers. At the other end of the spectrum, REITs trading at substantial premiums to NAV, particularly in healthcare and senior housing, have the currency to grow by acquisition and may increasingly look to acquire public targets for scale.
  • More Consolidation, at Home and Abroad. The largest transactions in our sample may well encourage further large-cap mergers of equals, and the most active sectors in this period (apartments, industrial, and shopping centers) remain likely candidates for further activity as these sectors continue to consolidate.
  • Antitrust and Regulatory Risk. Antitrust, foreign direct investment, and other regulatory closing condition risk has rarely been a gating issue in REIT M&A. Most real estate markets are fragmented, and the US HSR rules exempt many acquisitions of real property, as well as most acquisitions of and by REITs, from pre-merger notification.12 That may be changing. In March 2026, the FTC and DOJ requested public comment on whether to eliminate the HSR real estate exemptions and reevaluate the treatment of REITs, and legislation introduced in the Senate would narrow both.13 No rule changes have been proposed to date, and we expect most REIT combinations to continue to raise few substantive antitrust issues. Still, parties to large combinations, particularly in consumer sectors with overlapping local footprints, should factor potential agency, state attorney general, and public political scrutiny and resulting IR considerations into deal planning, timing, and risks. As a result of these trends, we expect REIT M&A transaction agreements to more often include provisions allocating regulatory risks, including efforts covenants, outside date extensions, and reverse termination fee provisions for regulatory failure and/or buyer breach of regulatory covenants (typically ranging from 5 – 10% of transaction equity value), all of which drive speed and certainty of closing for the target.

Index of Transactions: REIT M&A Transactions 2024-2026 YTD*

Date Announced Target Acquirer Sector Transaction
Value ($B)
Apr 2024 Apartment Income REIT Corp. Blackstone Residential 10.00
Nov 2024 Retail Opportunity Investments Corp. Blackstone Retail 4.00
Dec 2024 United Development Funding IV Ready Capital Corporation Mortgage 0.17
Jan 2025 NorthStar Healthcare Income, Inc. Welltower Healthcare 0.90
Mar 2025 Care REIT plc CareTrust REIT Healthcare 0.82
Jul 2025 City Office REIT, Inc. MCME Carell Holdings Office 1.10
Aug 2025 Elme Communities Cortland Partners, LLC Residential 2.16
Aug 2025 Dream Residential REIT Morgan Properties Residential 0.35
Sep 2025 Paramount Group, Inc. Rithm Capital Office 4.94
Oct 2025 PotlatchDeltic Corporation Rayonier Inc. Specialty 4.36
Oct 2025 Plymouth Industrial REIT, Inc. Makarora Management / Ares Alternative Credit Industrial 2.10
Oct 2025 Sotherly Hotels Inc. Kemmons Wilson / Ascendant Capital Partners Lodging 0.38
Nov 2025 CNL Healthcare Properties, Inc. Sonida Senior Living Healthcare 1.80
Dec 2025 Two Harbors Investment Corp. UWM Holdings Corp. (terminated) Mortgage 9.53
Dec 2025 Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. Blackstone / MW Group / DivcoWest Retail 2.30
Feb 2026 Peakstone Realty Trust Brookfield Industrial 1.20
Feb 2026 Kennedy-Wilson Holdings, Inc. McMorrow-led consortium / Fairfax Financial Diversified 6.63
Feb 2026 Veris Residential, Inc. Affinius Capital-led consortium Residential 3.40
Mar 2026 National Storage Affiliates Trust Public Storage Storage 10.50
Mar 2026 Two Harbors Investment Corp. CrossCountry Mortgage Mortgage 9.60
Apr 2026 Whitestone REIT Ares Real Estate Retail 1.70
Apr 2026 Sila Realty Trust, Inc. Blue Owl Healthcare 2.40
May 2026 Modiv Industrial, Inc. Global Net Lease, Inc. Industrial 0.54
May 2026 Sachem Capital Corp. Industrial Realty Group Mortgage 0.44
May 2026 Equity Residential AvalonBay Communities, Inc. Residential 33.68
Jul 2026 LXP Industrial Trust Brookfield / CPP Investments Industrial 5.20
Aug 2026 SEGRO plc Prologis, Inc. Industrial 25.21
Aug 2026 Cherry Hill Mortgage Investment Corp. TPG Mortgage Investment Trust Mortgage 1.32
Sep 2026 Centerspace Independence Realty Trust, Inc. Residential 2.00
Sep 2026 Slate Grocery REIT Brixmor / Everview Partners Retail 2.34

* Goodwin Procter LLP played a role in one or more of the surveyed transactions. No nonpublic information about any of these transactions has been used in writing this alert.


  1. [1] In 2018, we released our advisory alert “Trends in Public REIT M&A: 2012–2017,” chronicling select metrics across the 50+ REIT M&A transactions announced during the 2012 – 2017 period. We updated the sample set and findings in our 2019 update alert, in 2021, in 2022 (REIT M&A Trends Through the Pandemic (2020 – 2022)), and again in October 2023. ↩

  2. [2] Goodwin Procter LLP played a role in one or more of the surveyed transactions. No nonpublic information about any of these transactions has been used in writing this alert. ↩

  3. [3] JLL reported that private real estate fundraising far outpaced public REIT capital raising in 2025 and that REITs’ share of US commercial real estate transaction volume fell from about 11% in 2020 to about 6% in 2025. “M&A and Strategic Transactions: The Monitor,” JLL (Q1 2026) (data as of January 2026). ↩

  4. [4]  “US REIT M&A Activity Ramp-Up Extends into Early Months of 2026,” S&P Global Market Intelligence (2026). PwC put the median discount at 16.2% entering 2026. See “Real Estate and Real Assets: US Deals 2026 Midyear Outlook,” PwC (2026). ↩

  5. [5] See “What’s Driving All the REIT Mergers?” Multi-Housing News (2026). ↩

  6. [6] “Shareholder Activism in the Public REIT Sector: A Lookback at 2025 and What to Expect for 2026,” Goodwin (2026). ↩

  7. [7] “What Makes an UPREIT Go-Private Different,” Goodwin (2026); see also “Unlocking the UPREIT Structure: OP Unit Transactions for REITs,” Goodwin (2025). ↩

  8. [8] See “Privatizing Public REITs: Strategic Considerations and Legal Insights,” Goodwin (2025); see also “Trends in REIT M&A (2022–2023),” Goodwin (2023). ↩

  9. [9] “US REIT Mergers & Acquisitions Led by Public-to-Public Consolidation,” Nareit (2026). ↩

  10. [10] See, e.g., “Go-Shops Revisited,” 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1215 (2020). ↩

  11. [11] See, e.g., “Soaring Yields Strand REITs in M&A No-Man’s-Land,” Bisnow (2026). ↩

  12. [12] See “FTC Seeks Public Comments on Potential Major Changes for HSR Reportability of Real Estate Transactions,” Goodwin (2026). ↩

  13. [13] “Request for Public Comment Regarding Making Improvements to the Premerger Notification and Report Form,” FTC and DOJ (2026) (Questions 16 and 17); American Homeownership Act, S. 3904, 119th Cong. (2026). ↩

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